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Part 1: Domestic Aspects
A. INTRODUCTION
As the literature of public finance reveals, the distinction between
"direct" and "indirect" has been drawn in a number of ways but has
remained without much analytical usefulness. For analytical purposes,
it is much better to build on a tax classification which serves as a con-
venient point of departure for analyzing economic effects, e.g., taxes on
receipts versus taxes on expenditures, taxes on gross receipts versus
taxes on net receipts, taxes on flows versus taxes on stocks, taxes on
households versus taxes on firms, taxes on economic variables versus
lump-sum taxes, and so forth. Or, we may group particular taxes accord-
ing to their suitability in securing various objectives of tax policy, be
they equity or economic objectives, such as employment, capital forma-
tion, work effort, the efficiency of resources allocation, or concern with
exports, imports, and capital flows.
In the following discussion, we consider the comparative bearing of
certain "direct" and "indirect" taxes on these economic objectives, with
emphasis primarily on the differential effects of the corporate profits and
value-added taxes. [n Part 1, we take up effects on the domestic economy
and in Part 2 we deal with effects on international trade.
Effects on Employment
We begin with aggregate demand effects on employment due to
changes in the propensity to consume. Here the most important dis-
tinction is between the corporation profits tax and all other taxes. This
is so because the former—provided it is not shifted in the short-run
sense '—in substantiial part reduces retained earnings rather than house-
1Thepresence or absence of "short-run" shiftingisof considerable importance
throughout this paper and must, therefore, be defined briefly. (For a fuller discus-
sion see Marian Krzyzaniak and R. A. Musgrave, The Shifting of the Corporation
Income Tax, Baltimore, 1963.)
To simplify, let us assume that the profits tax is general (i.e., all business firms
are incorporated), and that all lines of production are equally capital intensive. As
the tax is imposed, there may be two developments.
The first is reduction. of the net rate of return on capital. Depending on the elas-
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hold income. It has little or no impact on consumption. If "short-run
shifting" occurs, however, the profits tax is similar in its consumption
impact to a sales tax.
For taxes that are not absorbed in retained earnings but affect house-
hold positions, the consumption impact is heavier in these four cases:
(1) for regressive than for progressive taxes (income effect); (2) for
taxes reflected in higher prices rather than reduction in disposable in-
come (money illusion effect); (3) for taxes on consumption as against
taxes on income (substitution effect); and, though this is more doubtful,
(4) for taxes on return to capital (saving as function of rate-of-return
effect). On grounds (1), (2), and (3), the employment-depressing effects
tend to be strongest for a sales tax or value-added tax of the consump-
tion type (defined below) and least for a progressive income tax, with a
general proportional income tax or value-added tax of the income type
falling in between.
While the difference in the consumption impact of various taxes may
be significant, it does not follow that this should be permitted to deter-
ticity of total capital supply, this may or may not result in a reduced rate of capital
formation. If it does, the initial decline in the net rate of return will be at least
partly recouped and the burden of the tax will be spread to other factors. This has
been referred to traditionally as "long-run shifting," making use of the Marshallian
interpretation of the long run as a period sufficiently long for a change in capital
stock to occur.
The second is imposition of the tax leading to changes in price or wage policy, or
both, such as to increase profits before tax, thereby holding the net rate of return
unchanged. If such adjustments are successful, which involves some form of market
imperfections, the detrimental effects on capital formation which may result under
the first do not arise. Since these adjustments may come about promptly, they have
been referred to traditionally as "short-run shifting."
For purposes of this paper, the traditional terminology will be used, even though
it may be criticized for two reasons: (a) capital adjustments in the second case may
in some instances come about fairly rapidly while administered price adjustments
in the first case may be rather slow; (b) adjustments of the type of the second case
may be just as lasting as those of the first-case type, i.e., the results of short-run
(quick) shifting may be the lasting long-run result.
The distinction between the two patterns, as stated above, is crucial for purposes
of our discussion. It remains relevant if the assumptions of generality of the tax
and equal capital intensity are dropped. Then the first may involve a capital flow
from the corporate to the unincorporated sector, designed to equalize the net rate
of return in both sectors (see the references to A. Harberger, footnote 6, below).
What matters, however, is that this net rate is reduced in both sectors, so that the
question of possible deterrent effects on total capital flows remains present. If the
total capital stock declines and the cost of capital increases, there will also be an
adjustment in production from more to less capital-intensive products. In the second
case, these flows will be absent or greatly reduced.
In the subsequent pages, frequent distinction will be drawn between situations in
which. the corporation tax is or is not "shifted." Reference is to short-run shifting,
and it is assumed that such shifting takes the form of price increase rather than
wage decrease.
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mine the composition of the tax structure. Assuming rational policy
making, the desired. over-all rate of consumption or saving in the econ-
omy may be obtained by appropriate adjustments in the over-all level
of tax rates (budget surplus or deficit).2 Since political restraints do not
grant this flexibility, or grant it to a limited degree only, the differential
consumption impact remains important. The major distinction, how-
ever, is not between direct versus indirect taxes, but between corpora-
tion profits versus other taxes.
Effects on Investment
Effects of various taxes on capital formation greatly depend on the
nature of the investment function.
If conditions are such that investment equals ex-ante saving, all
that matters are the previously noted effects on the propensity to con-
sume or save. But this is too simple a picture; the determinants of
investment are more complex than such a model implies. Depending
on whether investment is a function of acceleration, profitability, or
internal funds, different results hold for various taxes.
To the extent that investment is of the accelerator type, the rating
of various taxes is the same as that noted under employment effects.
To the extent that the rate of return is the determinant, the relevant
distinction is between taxes on profits (at the corporate or personal
level) and other taxes. Provided the corporation tax is not shifted in the
short-run sense it will be more investment restraining than other taxes,
although—and this can only be noted here—there remains the question
whether such effects result if adequate loss offsets are provided. If
investment depends on the internal flow of funds, the crucial distinction
is between taxes on business profits and other taxes, and the treatment
of dividends and retained earnings assumes major importance.
So far as growth policy is concerned (assuming the required capital
formation to be largely private) considerations of tax effects on invest-
ment pose a more serious problem for tax-structure policy than effects
on saving do. Whereas the latter may be corrected by adjustments
in the over-all rate of taxation or level of deficit or surplus, the former
cannot be thus offset. By and large, there is the presumption that
direct taxes on income, especially if progressive, are less favorable to
investment than indirect taxes are.
2SeeMusgra.ve, "Growth with Equity," Proceedings of the American Economic
Association for 1961, p. 326.
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Effects on Work Effort
The comparative effects of various taxes on work effort depend on
two considerations:
1. To the extent that work effort is related to the real wage rate,
it makes no difference whether a person pays a given tax directly and
visibly through income tax, or indirectly and hidden, either through a
sales tax or a shifted corporation tax. Only if individuals operate under a
money illusion will the income tax have a more restraining effect on
work effort than will taxes reflected in higher prices. The same holds
for what might be called a "spite effect" of visible (direct) taxes. How-
ever, it seems doubtful whether these are major considerations.
2. While it cannot be said a priori whether a person will work more
or less because he is subject to any given tax schedule, we can say that
he will work the less, the more progressive the schedule under which a
given tax is paid. This does not prove, as is sometimes assumed, that
taxpayers as a group will work less under a progressive schedule. It will
be so only if the rise in the marginal relative to the average tax rate
at higher levels of income does more to deter effort than the inverse
movement at lower incomes does to raise it.
Inasmuch as income taxes have been the traditional vehicle of pro-
gression, they have caused more concern in this respect than consump-
tion taxes. The basic issue, however, is one of high marginal rates, not
of direct versus indirect. (A consumption tax reduces the marginal real
wage as does an income tax. The fact that the latter also discriminates
against future versus present consumption need not mean that work
effort is reduced more.) As noted before, marginal rates at the upper
end of the scale have very little revenue significance, even when they
actually apply.3 Adjustments in these rates (if such remedy is needed)
may be undertaken with little or no change in the over-all revenue
balance between direct and indirect taxes.
Allocation Effects
We now turn to allocation effects other than the broad effects on the
division of resources between capital formation and consumption, or on
the over-all choice between leisure and goods. The generally accepted
principle of tax policy in this regard is that allocation effects should be
8Atthe executive level they are bypassed to a considerable degree by various
payment arrangements. Also, it may well be that high rates are shifted in consider-
able degree, i.e., compensated for by higher executive salaries. Surprisingly, this is
a possibility which has been given little research attention.
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neutral, unless special considerations to the contrary apply4—an im-
portant proviso. It permits acceptance of the general principle of neu-
trality to be combined with support of nonneutral allocation effects
where desirable. Balance-of-payment effects, considered in Part 2, may
be a case in point.
The essential distinction here is not between direct or indirect, income
or consumption, personal or firm characteristics of the tax base. Rather,
it is between general and partial taxes. Allocation effects are relevant
because interference with efficient allocation imposes an economic bur-
den, making the true cost of public services more than it would have
been had the resou:rce transfer been accomplished without such inter-
ference, The degree of interference will depend, among other factors,
on the generality (properly defined!) of the tax.
No "excess burden" arises where taxes are imposed on a base not
related to economic activity, e.g., a head tax or a truly once-and-for-all
capital levy; or, where the tax is imposed on economic activity, but no
adjustments are possible. For excess burden to arise, two conditions
must be met: (1) the tax must enter as a wedge between price paid and
price received, so that rates of substitution differ on the two sides of
the product market (costs of production versus gross prices paid by
consumers) or facto:r market (costs of factor purchase versus proceeds
from factor sale); and (2) the resulting change in prices must lead to
substitution in the purchase (sale) of products or of factors. Since—and
this is the crux of the matter—the elasticity of substitution tends to be
relatively high if the taxed transaction is narrowly confined to a particu-
lar market, partial taxes (which apply to particular markets only) are
more likely to create an excess burden than general taxes are.
Thus taxes on the salle or purchase of particular products change
relative prices and lead to the substitution of tax-free for taxed products;
no such substitution occurs as a result of a tax on the sale of all products.
An income tax on work income in a particular employment changes
relative net wages and results in a movement of labor which does not
occur if the tax applies to work income in all employment. A tax on
investment income in one industry (e.g., chain stores) or from one group
of firms (e.g., corporations) is more likely to affect the composition of
capital formation than a tax which applies to investment in all indus-
tries, and so forth.
Here as in other connections, the requirement of neutrality in the absence-of-
excess-burden sense must not be confused with the quite different and possibly
conificting requirement of equality in the horizontal-equity sense.
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Thus, there is a prima facie preference, on excess-burden grounds,
for a general as against a restricted tax. One must be careful, however,
to define "generality" in the relevant sense. A tax is made more general
if its coverage is extended over a wider range of economic choices of the
same type, choices that may be substituted more or less readily, such
as alternative consumer purchases, alternative work opportunities, or
alternative investment outlets. No in generality (in the relevant
sense) occurs if a partial tax on one type of choice (e.g., whether to
invest or not) is supplemented by a tax on another more or less unre-
lated type of choice (e.g., whether to earn wages or to retain leisure).
It is for this reason that there is no a priori preference on efficiency
grounds for a tax on all as against a tax on only some factor shares—a
matter we return to in comparing a value-added and a profits tax.5 At
the same time, there is a preference for a tax on factor incomes (on
both profits and wages or on profits only) which is general in applying
to earnings from all industries, as against one which is partial and applies
to earnings from some industries only.
This is not to deny that even "general" taxes will give rise to changes
in relative prices. An income tax on work effort changes the cost of
leisure; an income tax on investment income changes the cost of present
in terms of future consumption, as well as the gain to be derived from
surrendering liquidity, and so forth. But whatever the level of excess
burden inherent in such general taxes, the possibility of substitution
and excess burden tends to be much larger where partial taxes apply.
The partial nature of a tax may arise because there is a clear-cut
limitation of the tax base (e.g., excise versus general sales tax, corpora-
tion profits tax versus general profits tax, etc.) or because the tax
liability is a function of particular business practices (e.g., equity versus
debt financing, timing of income flow, distribution of profits, sale of
assets, etc.) and thus comes to influence the way in which the business
is conducted. Nonneutralities of the latter sort become the more serious,
the higher the rate of tax. In the case of the corporation tax in particular,
such nonneutralities may be more important than the fact that the tax
does not extend to the entire business sector.
Some attempts have been made to estimate the magnitude of excess
burden inherent in particular taxes. Harberger, on the assumption of
competitive markets, arrives at an estimate of $600 million for the
corporation income tax, showing that the magnitude of excess burden
See Sect. B, under Profits Tax Versus Value-Added Tax with Income Base.
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can be substantial.° At the same time, the existence of an excess burden
is not sufficient reason for rejecting a tax. It may be (although in this
case, hardly is) a worthwhile price to pay for equity. While a tax system
with zero excess burden could be devised (e.g., substitution of a head
tax of $600 or so for the federal tax structure), such a system would be
wholly unacceptable on equity grounds. The concepts of neutrality (no
excess burden) and equality (meeting the requirements of horizontal
or vertical equity) need not coincide. At the same time, lack of neu-
trality (or existence of excess burden) is to be avoided where it is not
justified in terms of other considerations.
Effects of Tax Substitutions
Keeping these various effects in mind, let us take a brief look at the
major implications of possible directions of change in the tax structure.
CONSUMPTION TAX FOR INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX. Substitution of a
retail sales tax for the present individual income tax would require a
rate of about 20 per cent, assuming all consumer expenditures other
than services to be covered. Assuming that on equity grounds income is
preferred to consumption as the appropriate index of equality, such a
substitution is desirable oniy if needed to achieve cardinal objectives
which cannot be fulfilled in the context of the individual income tax.
It appears that this is not the case.
If reduction of high marginal rates is desired—because of concern
with investment or work incentives, or to avoid other distorting alloca-
tion effects—substitution of a tax for the individual income tax
would not be required. We have noted that high marginal rates in the
upper income brackets have little bearing on the revenue strength of
the income tax. Reduction of the top bracket rate to 60, 50, and 40 per
cent would reduce yield by about $0.3, $0.7, and $1.4 billion, respec-
tively, amounting to a mere 0.7, 1.5, and 3 per cent of total income tax
revenue. Even the 3 per cent loss could be compensated for by a less
than one percentage point increase in the remaining bracket rates.
Moreover, we have noted that high marginal rates do not generally
apply, especially on. capital income, on which in many instances the
much lower capital gains rate can be paid.7 Indeed, reduction in top
6SeeArnold Harberger, "The Corporation Income Tax: An Empirical Appraisal,"
Tax Revision Compendium, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Ways and Means, 1959, Vol. I, pp. 231—250; and "The Incidence of the Corporation
Tax," Journal of Political Economy, June 1962, pp. 125—140.
See Musgrave, "How Progressive Is the Income Tax?" Tax Revision Com-
pendium, Vol. 4, p. 223.
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rates may well be called for as perhaps the only feasible way of reducing
horizontal inequities and curtailing the distorting effects of evasive
action, rather than as a means of raising general incentives. If so, it
could also be done within the context of the income tax, thereby retain-
ing a preferable distribution of the tax burden over the lower-middle
income range.8
SALES TAX FOE SELECTED EXCISES. The present federal excise structure
of $14 billion coul.d be replaced by a sales tax (presumably retail) of
about 7 per cent, with services excluded. The standard argument for the
change is that the sales tax would interfere less with consumer choice and
thus reduce excess burden. This argument has some merit, but also needs
qualification. In the first place, the bulk of excise revenue comes from
mass consumption items such as tobacco and liquor—items not highly
price elastic. Second, the resulting reduction in consumption can hardly
be charged as a burden, if that result is considered a policy objective.
This qualification has merit in relation to liquor and tobacco taxes. Also,
special excises may be in order where they play the role of benefit
taxes, an argument of considerable strength if applied to gasoline and
other automotive taxes.
The above suggests that the bulk of federal excises (liquor, tobacco,
and automotive excises account for about 75 per cent of the total) are
by no means entirely arbitrary. Yet, there remain excises yielding some
$3.5 billion (luggage, perfume, appliances, jewelry, etc.) which might be
consolidated into a general tax of, say, 1 per cent. However, removal of
this portion of the excise system alone and replacement by a general
sales tax of such a low rate would hardly justify the required adminis-
trative effort and collection cost.
If a substitution were to be made at all, the newly created sales tax
would have to replace more or less the entire excise structure. The net
gain on excess burden grounds from removal of "miscellaneous" excises
might or might not outweigh the loss from removal of benefit taxes.
Also, it is hardly for the economist to say (except where measurement of
negative externalities proves possible) whether sumptuary taxes should
be used or not, i.e., whether smoking and drinking are "demerit wants."
Moreover, the political aspect of the matter cannot be overlooked. If the
8Thisassumes, and realistically so, that the alternative to the income tax would
be a retail sales tax (or some equivalent thereof) and not a progressive Kaldor-type
spendings tax. Recent, and perhaps excessive emphasis on the shortcomings of the
income tax leads one to warn against the danger of comparing the imperfect income
tax with a hypothetical and perfect spendings tax. There is good reason to believe
that the latter would be even more difficult to handle.
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present burden of excises were replaceda general sales tax, partial
and more or less far-reaching substitution of the personal
income tax would undoubtedly follow. Indeed, this would be the most
important consequence of the substitution. In all, the nuisance-excise
problem might be solved more simply by substituting a one- or two-
point increase in income tax (or a smaller reduction) than by the trans-
formation of the excises into a sales tax.
VALUE-ADDED TAX FOR CORPORATION TAX. A third tax substitution
which has received increasing attention in recent discussions is that of a
value-added tax for the corporation income tax. The question has been
debated for some time at the state level, and in some instances a value-
added tax has been introduced in lieu of a corporation tax. The value-
added tax, however, is also being suggested increasingly at the federal
level, frequently as a partial substitute for the corporation tax.
The value-added tax is also advocated as the eventual solution of
tax structure integration in the European Common Market as a means
of applying uniform sales taxation on an origin basis. It would be supple-
mented by a uniform profits tax and a retail sales tax at rates free to
differ among countries. This tax will now be considered in some detail
in the domestic context, leaving the international aspects to Part 2.
B. SUBSTITUTION OF VALUE-ADDED TAX
FOR CORPORATION PROFITS TAX
Here, we examine briefly the general nature of a value-added tax and
then compare it with the corporation profits tax.
Nature of Value-Added Tax
To simplify matters, the corporate form is disregarded for the time
being, and it is assumed that the value-added tax applies to all firms.
Following Carl Shoup,9 we distinguish between a tax imposed on sales
receipts S minus materials M and depreciation D, with purchases of
depreciable assets I kept in the base; and a tax imposed on S —M—I,
with D kept in the base. The first, according to Shoup, is referred to as a
value-added tax of the income type (here written as VT-i) and the second
as a value-added tax of the consumption type (here written as VTC).
Under the total tax base for any one year equals net national
income (to simplify, other indirect taxes are disregarded), while under
it equals consu:mption. Thus, the base of exceeds that of
See Carl S. Shoup, "Theory and Background of the Value-Added Tax," Pro-
ceedings of the National Tax Association for 1955, pp. 6—19
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by net capital formation. From this, some conclusions may be drawn
regarding the relationship between value-added, income, and consump-
tion taxes.
1. Since the aggregate tax base for equals net national income,
it is the same as that for a truly general net income tax, VT. Imposed
at the same rate, the two taxes would give the same revenue yield, and
substitution of the one for the other would leave the distribution of the
tax burden unchanged. Indeed, imposed at the firm level might
be looked upon as source withholding of YT imposed at the recipient
of factor-income level. Suppose that an existing VT is replaced by an
equal rate The wedge between factor payment and take-home pay
is removed and replaced by a new wedge between sales proceeds and fac-
tor payment. If product prices remain unchanged, factor payments fall
and take-home pay remains unchanged in money terms; if product
prices rise, factor payments remain unchanged and take-home pay rises
in money terms but again remains constant in real terms. Here, as in
other instances of the closed-economy incidence problem, price-level
changes do not matter. What matters are changes in relative prices,
and these remain unchanged in this case.
The proposition of equivalence between VT holds true if we
think of both being imposed in a situation where the economy starts
with a zero capital stock. But since capital stock exists to begin with,
an important qualification arises. As is substituted for VT, capital
goods produced henceforth will be subject to and this will be equiv-
alent to a tax on capital income. But earnings derived from capital
assets already in existence are freed from tax as YT is dropped and thus
become the beneficiaries of a capital gain. In order to have a full equiv-
alence for VT, must be combined with an income tax on earnings
from old capital, or VT1 must be adjusted to disallow deduction of
depreciation on "old" capital goods.1° This, to be sure, is a short-run
complication oniy since in the longer run, all capital assets will be new.
But it may be quite significant at the outset.
Also, we should note that this proposition of equivalence relates to a
truly general and proportional income tax only. It does not hold for an
income tax with progressive rates, nor does it hold for an income tax
10 may be likened also to a consumption tax plus a sales tax on new capital
goods. Since the latter does not apply to "old" capital goods (purchased before the
tax substitution), an additional tax on capital goods is needed. As suggested in the
text, the equalizing tax might take the form of an income tax on income from old
capital, or, for that matter, a tax on the capital gain incurred by the holders of old
capital goods.
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with a flat rate but with personal exemptions. Moreover, we have over-
looked the existence of corporations. If YT, at the personal
level, fails to reach retained earnings, substitution of now includes
such profits in the tax base.
2. Since the aggregate tax base for VT0 equals consumption, it is
the same as that for a general retail tax on consumer goods. Substitution
of the one for the other at equal rates leaves both yield and distribution
of the tax burden unchanged. Suppose that a consumption tax in the
form of a retai' sales tax ST is replaced by VT0. The latter may he
looked upon as a means of spreading ST over successive stages of produc-
tion, such that the successive partial tax bases at the various stages
aggregate to the ST base at the final stage. Assuming competitive (as
distinct from mark-up) pricing no pyramiding results, and VT0 and ST
are equivalent.
3. It follows that the difference between and VT0 is the same as
that between YT and ST. Just as substitution of CT for YT benefits
the saver relative to the consumer and is therefore regressive, so is the
substitution of for VT2.
Profits Tax Versus Value-Added Tax with Income Base
We now turn tocomparison of the income-base type of value-
added tax, with a corporation profits tax PT. Limiting both to the
corporation sector, the respective tax bases are about $50 billion for PT
and an estimated $260 billion for With applied to all firms
(excluding services and agriculture) the base is estimated at $330 billion.
Thus, a rate of 7 to 9 per cent would be needed to obtain the yield
now obtained from the corporation tax of 52 per cent. Substitution of
VT2 for PT would thus involve approximately an 80 per cent reduction
in the rate of tax applicable to profit income, while a new 8 per cent
tax would be imposed on other factor incomes, including capital income
in the form of interest. What would be the results?
To simplify matters, let us first disregard the fact that PT is limited
to the corporation sector while VT2 might be more general, and assume
that both apply ove:r the same range. We then consider the tax substitu-
tion under two short-run shifting assumptions.11
PT NOT SHIFTED. A profits tax which is not shifted in the short-run
sense falls initially on the profit share. Substitution of then reduces
the rate of tax on profit income, while increasing that on other incomes.
The result will be: (1) a regressive redistribution of disposable income,
11Fordefinition of short-run shifting, see 1, above.
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the distribution of profit income being much less equal than that of
income as a whole; (2) a reduction in the community's propensity to
consume; and (3) such favorable (rate-of-return) effects on investment
as may result from reduced profits taxation.
Adjustment of relative prices to the tax substitution may again in-
volve various patterns of absolute price change. If product prices remain
unchanged, total disposable factor income remains unchanged as well,
but the distribution of net factor shares is changed in favor of profit
recipients. With downward rigidity of money wages, this is not a likely
adjustment. More likely, product prices will rise by the rate of VT1.
Wage income then remains constant while disposable profit income
rises, both counted in money terms. As product prices have risen, the
real value of wage incomes is reduced, leaving the redistribution in real
terms the same as before.
In a competitive system, where PT is not shifted in the short-run
sense, substitution of VT1 for PT implies substitution of a general
income tax for a selective tax on profit income only. Imposed at the
firm level, this may be looked upon as substitution of a tax on all factor
payments for one on payments to capital only (profits). Does this mean
that VT1, as the more general income tax, has an: efficiency advantage
over PT?
We have seen that a tax on profits from capital in one industry only
is more likely to affect investment decisions and to cause an excess
burden than a tax on profits from investment in all industries. Capital
supply to only one industry is likely to be more elastic than the total
supply to all industry. The same holds for the supply of labor to one
industry as against the supply of labor as a whole. Therefore, excess
burden is likely to be less, if a given yield is derived from a general tax
on profit income, than from a profits tax in some industries only. The
same holds for a tax on labor income.
It does not follow, however, that excess burden is reduced if a tax
on both investment and labor income is substituted for a tax on invest-
ment income only, assuming each to apply in all industries. The essential
point is that a tax on wage income does not act as a neutralizing factor
in the choice between current and future consumption (or investment)
which is interfered with by PT and which gives rise to its excess burden.
To be sure, the inclusion of wages in the tax base permits the tax rate on
profits to be reduced, and this will lower the excess burden of PT.
However, a new excess burden is added as the tax rate on wage income
is increased and the worker's choice between income and leisure comes
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to be interfered with. This being so, we cannot say a priori whether the
net efTect of the substitution is to reduce or increase total excess burden.
It all depends on what the elasticities of substitution for various factor
suppliers are.'2 A general income tax is more general than a profits tax,
in the equity sense of the term, but not in the sense which permits
simple deductions regarding the excess-burden issue.
Granted that there is no way of telling what happens to excess burden
on the factor supply side of the market, is there not an additional prob-
lem of excess burden on the production-consumption side of the picture?
Suppose we look at PT, not as an income tax on profits, but as a pur-
chase tax on capital, payable by the business firm. Will not a purchase
tax applicable to capital only result in an increase in the cost of capital
relative to that of labor, causing changes in production techniques and
a rise in the prices of capital "intensive" products as against labor "in-
tensive" products? The answer is that such changes will come about
provided capital supply is elastic, but they do not signal an additional
excess burden over and above that already recorded on the factor-supply
side of the market. This change in relative prices merely reflects the
changed pattern of factor supplies or endowment.
The story is the other way around if a tax is imposed on the sale of
one particular product only. In this case, consumer choice is distorted
and the excess burden arises at the consumption end of the scale. This
may give rise to changes in factor returns and hence factor supplies,
but again these are not to be counted as an additional excess burden
but merely reflect adaptation to the change in consumer choice.
Notwithstanding recent argumentation to the contrary,13 it follows
that there is no necessary efficiency case in favor of a tax applicable to all
factor shares, as against a tax limited to the capital share only. By the
same token, there is no general efficiency case favoring over PT,
assuming both to apply over the same industry range.
12Theargument needs modification to the extent that there exists substitutability
between present consumption and leisure. The profits tax discriminates in favor of
present over future consumption. The wages tax discriminates in favor of leisure
over goods. To the extent that the profits tax leads to substitution of income (less
leisure) for future consumption, addition of the wages tax will reduce excess burden.
Such a situation may be imagined—more work requires more food—but is not likely
to be of major importance.
Oneof the coauthors pleads guilty to having contributed to this error (see
Musgrave, "Another Look at Depletion," Naeional Tax Journal, June 1962, p. 205).
The argument there piresented involves three steps: (1) that a profits tax with the
McDonald-type base adjustment does in fact transform the profits tax into a general
factor tax; (2) that gives rise to changes in. relative product prices; and (3) that
"undoing" the change in relative product prices caused by the profits tax without
adjustment must reduce excess burden. Points 1 and 2 stand, but 3 is wrong.
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PT SHIFTED. The situation differs drastically if PT is shifted in the
short-run sense. In this case, profits were not depressed to begin with,
so that removal of PT (assuming the initial shifting to be reversed) does
not offer an inducement to investment. PT now resembles a sales tax;
and since it applies in both the capital and consumer good industries,
it resembles a sales tax on both capital and consumer goods.'4 Since
such a sales tax is equivalent to the substitution does not affect
the state of distribution between wage and profit income, nor should it
be expected to have a bearing on the level of investment.
It bears repeating that a PT which is shifted in the short-run sense
is similar to a proportional income tax, rather than a consumption tax,
as it might seem to be at first sight. But note that the resemblance is
to a proportional income tax. There remains a substantial distributional
difference between the shifted PT and an income tax with exemptions
and progressive rates. At the lower end of the scale in particular, the
distinction between a proportional income tax without exemptions and a
progressive income tax with exemptions is more marked than that be-
tween a proportional income tax and a consumption tax.
Though leaving the broad distributional pattern and investment ef-
fects unchanged, substitution of nevertheless has the advantage
of reducing excess burden. The reason is that introduction of PT,
through the mechanism of short-run shifting, changes relative product
prices. Those changes occur because the increase in price needed to
maintain net profits differs with the characteristics (turnover, margin,
financial structure, etc.) of firms and industries.15 The changes in rela-
tive prices introduce inefficiencies into the product mix and gives rise
to an excess burden at the production-consumption end of the scale.16
Introduction of does not cause such a burden since no change in
relative prices will result. Therefore, substitution of for PT reduces
excess burden on the product side.
In all, it is evident that any policy evaluation of the for PT.
substitution depends crucially on one's assumptions regarding the short-
The analogy is not complete since the price changes needed to shift the profits
tax are not at a uniform ad valorem rate but depend on the firm's profit margin.
However, this is not decisive for the present argument. See the following note.
15SeeCarl Shoup, "Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax: Capital Structure
and Turnover Rates," National Tax Journal, Mar. 1948, reprinted in Readings in
the Economics of Taxation, Shoup and Musgrave, Eds. American Economic Associa-
tion, 1959.
16Thisexcess burden is not to be confused with the burden, in the case of short-
run shifting, noted to arise on the factor supply side through interference with the
investment decision.
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run shifting of PT. Without short-run shifting, the substitution is re-
gressive, raises investment incentives, and may or may not reduce or
raise excess burden. With short-run shifting, the equity and investment
effects of the substitution are insignificant, but the presumption is that
excess burden will be reduced.
Profit s Tax Ver2us Value-Added Tax with Con$umptiom Ba2e
A similar analysis may be applied to substitution of VT0 for PT.
Assuming no short-run shifting of PT, the redistribution is now from
consumers to profits recipients, with possible stimulating rate-of-return
effects on investment being even more marked than in the case of VT2.
Assuming PT to be shifted in the short-run sense, substitution of VT0
now favors savers relative to consumers. This is the case because the
sales-tax-on-capital-goods component of the shifted corporation tax is
removed, while the sales-tax-on-consumer-goods component is retained.
Significance of Difference in Sector Coverage
Additional considerations enter, if we allow for the fact that PT
applies to corporations only, whereas VT might well apply to all firms.
Assuming that PT is not shifted in the short-run sense, limitation of
PT to the corporate sector, as emphasized by Harberger, may give
rise to capital flows from the corporate into the unincorporated sector,
with resulting loss of efficiency in allocation. 17
Interms of our preceding discussion, the tax on profits in the corporate
sector may be looked upon as a factor tax which is restricted in the
relevant sense of applying to employment in a particular set of indus-
tries (those which are incorporated) only, while leaving other industries
tax free. Thus, there results an inefficient allocation of factors between
industries, giving rise to an excess burden on the consumption side,
similar to that which results from an excise or value-added tax on the
product of the corporate sector only. This burden may be removed by
extending PT to the unincorporated sector, or by substituting a general
VT1 applicable to all sectors. Elimination of this particular efficiency
loss will then be added to the above-noted effects of the substitution.
If PT is shifted in the short-run sense as here defined, the Harberger
effect does not result. But, as noted before, an excess burden arises
because shifting distorts relative prices, whether PT is limited to the
corporate sector or is general.
See footnote6, above.
95ALLOCATION, DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
Relation to Individual Income Tax
Brief reference should be made to the relationship of PT and VT to
an equitable system of individual income taxation. Assuming that PT
is not shifted in the short run, and the "conduit" view of the
corporation, PT interferes with horizontal equity in that dividend in-
come is "double taxed," but it strengthens horizontal equity in that it
provides a means of reaching retained earnings. Replacement of PT by
removes both the disadvantage and the advantage. Whether that
would be a net gain or loss to horizontal equity is a matter of conjecture.
But, given the preferential treatment of capital gains, there would prob-
ably be a net loss.
Interindustry and Interfirm Differences
So far, we have considered the effects of these substitutions in rather
aggregative terms, without allowance for interindustry or interfirm dif-
ferences. It remains to allow for the important fact that the distribution
of the tax base will be quite different under the various taxes. For this
purpose let us again disregard the corporate versus unincorporated
sector distinction and assume that all taxes apply over the same range.
For any one firm we have the following identities :18
S =sales;W =payroll;D =depreciation;P =profits;=
purchasesfrom other firms on current account and =changein
inventory; or,
where QK =purchaseson capital account and =thenet increase
in depreciable assets.





Since, under any one tax, a uniform rate applies to all firms or industries,
18Thispresentation may be readily expanded to distinguish between profit and
interest income, thus bringing out the differential bearing of financial structure on
various taxes. For simplicity it is not carried out here.
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any one firm or industry will be benefitted—in the sense of reducing its
initial share in the tax liability—by a tax substitution such that its
ratio of old base to new base exceeds that for industry as a whole. The
relevant ratios, which must be above average to make the substitution










A number of these ratios are easily understood. Thus, replacement
of PT by ST helps a firm with a large profit margin. As between firms
with equal turnover, since the rate of return Y =P/K=P/S.S/K, it
also helps the more profitable firm. Replacement of PT by helps a
firm with a high profits to wage ratio. As between firms with equal capital
intensity, the gain is with the more profitable firm; while as between
firms with equal profitability, the gain is with the more capital-intensive
firm. Substitution of VT., for PT is advantageous if the profits are high
relative to wages and if net investment is high. Replacement of ST by
VT1 is advantageous to a firm whose wage and profit payments are a
small fraction of sales. Substitution of VT0 for ST involves the same
considerations, but again the expanding firm is at an advantage. Sub-
stitution of VT., for finally, is advantageous to the expanding firm.
It is evident that the impact of various taxes differs greatly by types
of firm or industry. Without attempting to characterize various indus-
tries in terms of the coefficients involved (something that should be done
in a follow-up analysis) some of the general results may be noted. Most
important, perhaps, is the role of the growth variable under VT0. Sub-
stitution of for PT in turn rewards the more profitable firm. Ob-
viously, the growth effect of VT0 is superior to that of However,
the relative advantage which results from expansion may be matched
under and, for that matter, under PT by granting more rapid
depreciation. Moreover, the results may be changed by combining var-
ious features of these taxes. Thus, PT combined with an investment
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credit takes on some of the characteristics of and as the required
tax rate would be larger, the incentive effect in the direction of a high
expansion rate could be higher as well.
Implications for State Finance
The preceding discussion has been in a closed-economy context. One
correction of this assumption allows for state finance in the federal
setting. The other relates to an international setting, considered in
Part 2.
In comparing the implications of PT and at the level of state
finance, some additional considerations arise. If it is held that state
business taxes should be of the benefit type, there is good reason behind
the proposition that value added is a better index of benefits received
than profits are. Also, if the state business tax is to rest on a benefit
basis, the tax should be imposed in such a way that the burden is passed
on to the beneficiaries of the public services in question. This is accom-
plished by imposing a tax which will increase the cost of operation, just
as the public service has reduced it. This will be accomplished by
but, unless there is complete short-run shifting, not by PT. Provided
that "benefit" and "tax" shifting will be similar, neutralization is then
achieved, whatever the direction of the shift. Assuming that public
services tend to reduce all costs equally, this result is accomplished by
and to the extent that particular (e.g., transport) costs are reduced,
particular cost taxes (e.g., on gasoline) are in order. To the extent that
the beneficiaries of public services are out of state (be it owners of capital
or consumers of the product) it is only proper that the tax burden be
"exported," corresponding to the export of benefits received.
Export of tax burden which does not match export of benefits is a
different matter. Thus a retail sales tax ST has the disadvantage (looked
at from the "nationalistic" point of view of any one state) that it is
paid wholly domestically. PT has the advantage that it can be exported
to the out-of-state shareholder, while has the advantage that it
can be exported to the out-of-state consumer, provided the position
of the exporting state in the national market is sufficiently strong. Thus,
VT has its orderly use in fiscal federalism if used to match benefit
export by cost export; but it may be used also to burden out-of-state
consumers, where such a burden is not justified. In other words, export
exemption is appropriate for nonbenefit but not for benefit taxes.
Finally, there is the question of how the imposition of PT, and
ST by any particular state affects the allocation of capital on a nation-
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wide basis. Differentials in ST (assuming consumer immobility) do not
affect the location of production, while differentials in PT and VT1 do.
If we assume that the interstate mobility of capital is higher than that
of labor, the distortion will be greater under PT than under VT1. But,
given a high degree of labor mobility, this may not be the case.
Conclusions
What conclusions may be drawn from all this regarding the desira-
bility of replacing the corporation income tax by a value-added tax?
If we assume that PT is not shifted in the short-run sense, the equity
case for retaining it must rest on the proposition that an "absolute"
corporation tax is justified; or it must be based on the political consid-
eration that substi.tute taxes would be less progressive. Otherwise, re-
moval of PT is in order, provided (1) a way is found to integrate retained
earnings into the individual income tax,'9 and (2) transition problems
are met.2° Whether or not the revenue loss should be made up by VT1
is a different matter. While VT1 would be preferable on equity grounds
to a retail sales tax or the better answer might be increased reliance
on the individual income tax. But ruling this out, VT1 might not be a
bad solution.
Such a substitution might also have desirable economic effects. While
it cannot be argued as a general proposition that substitution of VT1
for a general PT must reduce excess burden, substitution of a general
VT1, which includes the unincorporated sector for a PT on corporations
only, may well have this (Harberger) effect—if no short-run shifting
applies. Moreover, the resulting redistribution in favor of profit income
may encourage investment via the rate-of-return effect. An even stronger
investment incentive could be given by the substitution of but
this would hardly be tenable on equity grounds. If the revenue loss
from PT were made up by individual income tax, investment effects
would depend on the nature of the rate adjustments.
If we assume that the corporation tax is largely shifted in the short-run
19Ifthis were done through the partnership method, it would still be necessary
to determine taxable profits. Substitution of VT1 for the remainder of the profits
tax, therefore, would complicate rather than simplify the tax law. Substitution of
VT1 for PT would simplify matters only if the taxation of retained earnings under
the individual income tax were dispensed with, or if it were accomplished through
full taxation of capital gains under the income tax.
20Referenceis to the argument that removal of the tax, by creating capital gains,
would benefit present owners. To some extent, at least, this could be met by taxing
the capital gain. But even if some windfalls remain, this is essentially a short-run
problem which should not stand in the way of longer-run tax reform.
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sense,2' possible substitution of VT.4 for PT becomes much less contro-
versial. Excess burden is reduced, but distributional and investment
effects are minor. Substitution of on the other hand, might still
offer a significant inducement to investment, as well as distributional
change, since, as noted before, the short-run shifted corporation tax is
equivalent to a general and proportional income tax, and not a consump-
tion tax.
Part 2. International Aspects
A. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, much attention has been given to the implication of
alternative taxes in the open-economy setting. From the international
point of view, the primary problem is one of minimizing distorting
effects of national tax structures on international trade and capital flows.
From the narrower point of view of national concern, there is the problem
of how the structure relates to the balance-of-payments position.
The choice between income and product taxes is at the heart of these
issues. It is dealt with here primarily by comparing the effects of a
corporation profits tax PT with those of a value-added tax of the income
type VT1. As noted previously, VT1 applies to both capital and con-
sumer-goods industries, with depreciation omitted from the tax base.
It is broadly equivalent, in the absence of exemptions and differential
rates, to a general tax on factor incomes. Following current practice,
a rebate ER of the value-added tax is given on exported goods, and a
compensating sales tax IT is imposed on imports.
While our major concern is with the VT1-PT substitution, certain
alternatives are considered as well, including, attachment of an ER-IT
arrangement to PT, substitution of for the personal income tax,
use of (value-added tax, consumption base), and so forth.
A .s.sumptions
We begin with a comparison on efficiency grounds and then examine
balance-of-payments aspects. We assume PT to be abolished and re-
placed by an equal yield If VT1 applies for all firms while PT applies
to the corporate sector only, the corporate sector will benefit. Since this
sector is more export intensive, favorable balance-of-payments effects
result. This factor is disregarded for the time being, it being assumed
that all firms are incorporated.
21Forsuch evidence see Krzyzaniak and Musgrave, The Shifting of the Corporation
Tax, p. 5.
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In examining the international consequences of various taxes, the
relevant factor is not the absolute level of rates but rate differentials. To
simplify matters, we shall assume that PT and VT are applied in one
country only, thus equating the absolute rate with the differential rate.
The effects of the tax substitution from both an efficiency and bal-
ance-of-payments point of view depend on the incidence of the profits
tax. Since this is a controversial matter which cannot be resolved here,
the analysis is again developed under two assumptions: (1) that the
profits tax is not shifted in the short-run sense; and (2) that it is thus
shif ted, i.e., that the rate of return is maintained to begin with by shifting
the tax forward onto the product.22 In the latter case, shifting is assumed
to occur only with regard to domestic sales of products, the prices of
which are not dominated by import competition. Shifting of a tax dif-
erential is assumed to be impossible with regard to export sales.2 Also,
short-run shifting that resulted from imposition of a profits tax is as-
sumed to be reversed when the tax is removed.
The discussion is not developed in terms of full-scale international
equilibrium. In other words, the world offer curve for traded commodi-
ties is taken as given, and repercussions of foreign economic adjustments
to United States tax changes on the terms of trade are generally not
allowed for. Also, it is assumed that exchange rates are fixed and, in.
most instances, that factor mobility is limited to capital. Finally, world
demand for internationally traded products is assumed to have an elas-
ticity in excess of one.
B. EFFICIENCY ASPECTS
It is currently assumed in most discussions that a value-added tax with
an ER-IT arrangement is efficient from an international allocation point
of view. Similarly, it seems to be held that the efficiency of a profits
22Fordefinition of short-run shifting, see footnote 1, above.
That is to say, export shifting is limited to the lowest rate, which rate may be
looked upon as a general tax. Suppose that before imposition of the profits taxes,
the rates of return both domestic D and foreign F equal y. Now, profits taxes are
imposed, such that the domestic tax rate td exceeds the foreign rate &j.Sincethe
foreign tax rate is the smaller one, it can be shifted in its entirety. As a result, the
foreign gross rate of return rises to y/i. —t,and the foreign net rate of return
stays at y. The domestic gross rate of return also rises to y/l —tjand the domestic
net rate of returnfalls to (1 —4,/i — t1)y.The resulting percentage change in the
net domestic rate of return or non-shifted component of 4,equals —td/1—Ii< 0
and is the smaller for any given tdthelarger is t1. The relative position of domestic
investors, measured by the ratio drops from 1 to 1 —td/1—t.r andthe same
observation holds. Now suppose that 4,isremoved. Shifting of the foreign tax now
becomes impossible, andfalls to (1tj)y.At the same time,returns to y.
The percentage gain indue to removal of tdequals —t1/i—t1,and
rises to 1/1 —t1> 1.
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tax would not be improved by such attachments. Current practice among
GATT countries is in line with this rule by applying ER-IT to the value-
added and product taxes, but not to the profits tax. In this section, we
consider the underlying principles and re-examine the efficiency case for
one or the other tax with or without export-rebate-import tax arrange-
ment. We assume for the moment that such an arrangement is feasible
for the profits tax.
Efficiency Requirements
In determining which tax arrangements are or are not efficient from a
world-allocation point of view, two basic requirements are considered.
One is that tax arrangements should not affect the choice of country
in which factors are put to work. Since it is usually assumed that capital
is internationally mobile whereas labor is not, primary concern here is
with differential taxation of capital returns rather than with labor in-
come. The other requirement is that tax arrangements should not affect
international commodity flows and thus not interfere with the efficient
international trade use of given national factor endowments.24 Put dif-
ferently, taxes should not distort relative factor and commodity prices
in the international markets. As before, the comparison between
and PT differs, depending on whether or not there is short-run shifting
of PT.
Factor Mobility Without Commodity Flows
To put the matter clearly, suppose first that factors are mobil.e but
there are no commodity flows.
PT NOT SHIFTED. To begin with, suppose that only capital has inter-
national mobility. If PT is not shifted in the short-run sense, it reduces
the rate of return on capital. Since international capital flows tend to
equalize the net rate of return, imposition of PT in country A will
reduce its share in the world capital stock. Substitution of for PT,
by broadening the tax base to other factor incomes, will reduce the
rate of tax on the mobile factor and extend taxation to immobile factors.
This reduces the distorting effect of PT which resulted in underalloca-
tion of capital in the country with an excess PT rate. Contrary to the
domestic finding, where there was no a priori excess burden argument
for VT as against PT, such an argument now applies. The reason is
24Theadditional efficiency aspect of tax interference between purely domestic
goods is considered in Part 1 and therefore omitted here.
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simply that capital is assumed to be internationally mobile while labor
is not, whereas domestically both supplies are considered more or less
elastic.25
Since the profits tax differential may be highly nonneutral with re-
spect to international capital allocation, can this norineutrality be elimi-
nated alternatively by an ER-IT arrangement? The answer is clearly,
no. The appropriate way of dealing with the matter (while retaining a
profits tax) is avoidance of differentials through uniform rates, or taxa-
tion of capital at residence of ownership rates.26 The ER-IT arrange-
ment, to be sure, would tend to reduce the distortion which comes
about because there is underinvestment in the excess-rate country, but
it would add other distortions as between domestic and export industries.
Clearly it is not the appropriate remedy.
A similar argument may be applied to a situation with international
labor mobility while excluding capital mobility. The conclusion is re-
versed. Since the :profits tax PT is entirely on the immobile factor,
whereas extends to the mobile factor, it is now the latter which
interferes with world factor movements and is inferior. The ER-IT
arrangement is again an inappropriate remedy. What is needed is an
income tax arrangement by which wage income is taxed at a rate inde-
pendent of place of work, e.g., country of birth. Looking at as a
general income tax, application of this principle becomes extremely
difficult. In this context VT. is clearly an inferior tax. While it is granted
that the assumption of capital mobility is more reasonable than that
of labor mobility, the latter has assumed increasing reality in the
Commo:n Market.
PT SHIFTED. If PT is shifted on domestic sales, its distorting effects
on international capital flows are greatly reduced, as is the efficiency
gain to be derived, from substituting PT now leaves unaffected
the net rate of return on capital engaged in production for domestic
sales. However, capital engaged in the export industries must pay the
tax, leading to a structural capital flow away from exports. This would
be eliminated by substitution of or an export rebate for PT would
now be suitable to eliminate this effect.
25Analogousto the preceding note, the efficiency aspects of excess burden suffered
by domestic factor suppiiers (internationally mobile or not) are again omitted here
as they are treated in Part 1.
26Thisprecisely is aLmed at by the foreign tax credit which must be distinguished
from the export rebate arrangement as used with VT and referred to in the text
as ER.
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Commodity Flows Without Factor Mobility
Next suppose that there are no resource movements between countries
so that effects on commodity trade only are to be considered.
EFFECTS OF Let country A introduce without such a tax in
country B. Suppose also that monetary policy in country A is such as
to leave its factor costs unchanged while raising domestic prices. If no
ER-IT arrangement applies, exports fall and imports rise, and the tax
is highly unneutral. If an export credit is given and a compensating
import tax is imposed, export prices are unchanged and there is no
change in relative prices of domestic and imported goods. No price
effects on commodity flows result and the tax is rendered neutral. This
is the basic argument for attaching the ER-IT arrangement to VT,27
thereby applying cost taxes on a destination basis. Since we are dealing
here with a flexible system, aggregate income effects may be assumed
neutral as well.
The situation is changed if we assume that monetary policy in country
A is such as to maintain product prices and permit the tax wedge of VT
to reduce factor prices. In this case, introduction of without ER
leaves export prices unchanged; moreover the price of imported relative
to domestic goods does not change in the absence of IT. The ER-IT
arrangement would now be nonneutral and should not be permitted.
As distinct from the closed-economy case, where the direction of
price-level change due to VT did not matter,28 the movement of absolute
prices and costs becomes crucial in the open-economy context. The
accepted conclusion that VT calls for the ER-IT arrangement is thus
based on a specific assumption regarding price-level behavior. Given the
worldwide tendency of wages to be rigid in a downward direction, we
see no objection to this assumption but, in putting the theoretical argu-
ment, it is important to notice its strategic role.
EFFECTS OF PT. Consider now the consequences of introducing PT in
country A. Assuming no short-run shifting, this may lower capital
formation for both domestic and export production and in time shrink
the volume of exports. However, there are no direct commodity flow
effects, as resulted (assuming a price rise) from without an ER-IT
arrangement. Hence, no such arrangement is called for.
27Thetext argument has been in terms of applying VT in country A without
such tax in B. If B has an equal rate tax no problem arises. If the taxes are unequal,
the text argument applies to A's excess rate only. As noted before, a rule by which
each country rebates its full tax and applies an import tax at the full rate of its
tax also serves the purpose of eliminating the differential rate.
28SeePart 1, Sect. B, under Nature of Value-Added Tax.
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The picture changes if we introduce the assumption that PT is shifted
on domestic sales in the short-run sense, giving rise to increased domestic
prices. 29Atthe same time, there is no shifting on export sales (remember
that reference is tc' the differential rate). We then have a situation anal-
ogous to that of withrising prices. An export rebate associated with
PT is now called for to keep total export costs (factor costs plus tax)
from rising. Similarly, an import tax is required to keep the prices of
imported goods from falling below those of domestic goods. Moreover,
the export rebate is needed to prevent a structural capital effect, i.e.,
capital flow from export to home production. A PT which is shifted
domestically but not on export sales in fact acts as a differential profits
tax on the export industry. An ER-IT arrangement is needed to elim-
inate it. The validity of the GATT practice which does not apply
ER-IT to the profits tax thus rests on the assumption that there is no
domestic short-run. shifting.3°
Commodity and Factor Flows Combined3'
Consider now the realistic case where both factor and commodity
flows occur. We assume that the profits tax is not shifted domestically
and that factor supplies originating in any one country are fixed. At
the same time, their allocation between home and foreign use responds
to differentials in the rate of return.
Taxes on factor incomes, on profits or wages, will distort factor flows
if imposed at rates of the country of activity (source of income) but
will be neutral with regard to factor flows if imposed at rates of the
country of residence of owner. What can be said about distorting effects
Contrary to the competitive case, where the absolute price level change in
response to cannot be derived from the price behavior of firms, the administered
pricing adjustment fo:r a shifted PT does suggest an absolute increase in product
prices. As far as the effect on domestic prices (and the justification of iT) and on
total export cost (and the justification of ER) are concerned, the shifted PT case
thus resembles the case with constant factor costs, while the PT case with
no shifting resembles the case with reduced factor costs.
80ArticleIV :2 says that imports may be subjected to such internal taxes as are
imposed on like domestic products. This provision is not tied to particular kinds of
taxes, nor is it said explicitly what criterion (price increase?) should be used to
decide which taxes are or are not eligible. Article VI :1, which rules out dumping,
nevertheless permits allowance to be made for differences in taxation (without
specifying particular taxes) and for "other differences affecting price comparability."
Thus it appears that for the export credit the basic distinction is between taxes that
do and taxes that do not affect prices, and presumably the same logic should carry
over to the import compensating tax. It follows that the GATT rules call for a
profits tax ER-IT if there is short-run shifting.
This section was added in response to Lawrence B. Krause's suggestion that
the two extreme cases be combined.
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of such taxes on commodity flows? A profits tax by origin of capital,
though not affecting factor flows, nevertheless may give rise to changes
in demand patterns, which in turn may have repercussions on commodity
flows. But such repercussions are merely responses to changes in effective
preferences, and are not to be considered distortions. If the profits tax
is by country of activity, the distorting effects on factor flows will again
react on commodity flows, such reactions now emanating from both the
supply and the demand side. The former are part and parcel of the
distorting effects on factor flows, the adjustment to which involves
responses in commodity flows; and the latter again reflect changes in
demand patterns. In all, it appears that income taxes whether by country
of residence or of activity have no direct distorting effects on commodity
flows, even though they may in many ways affect the volume and direc-
tion of commodity trade.
A value-added tax of the income type with ER-IT does not dis-
tort commodity flows. However, it may distort factor flows. Since
is equivalent to a tax on factor incomes, it includes a PT. Since the
implicit PT is at country of activity rates it distorts factor flows.
While the implicit PT rate is apt to be much below that of an outright
PT (because of the larger base) and hence the distorting effects on
capital flow to be correspondingly less, the similarity nevertheless exists
in principle. Since the factor taxes implicit in cannot be converted
into factor taxes by residence, is inferior to the factor-tax approach
on a residence base. That is true at least if labor is immobile relative
to capital.
Leaving the normative level, it should be noted that factor taxes
are frequently imposed not by residence but by place of activity, whereas
product taxes are usually subject to ER-IT. Reliance on the VT type of
tax, therefore, may be preferable on international allocation grounds,
especially where PT (as against wage tax) differentials are concerned.
Further Problems
The discussion above sets forth the main principles involved in the
efficiency comparison of direct and indirect taxes. Certain additional
considerations will be noted briefly.
DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE. The international point of view has been
taken here as related to international factor and commodity flows. In
addition, the international distribution of available tax bases should
be briefly noted.
So far as income taxation is concerned, the crucial matter with re-
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spect to efficiency is that mobile factors should be taxed at rates of
country of residence of factors. It does not matter from the efficiency
point of view whether the revenue accrues to country of activity—as it
does with the foreign tax credit arrangement—or to country of residence.
However, present tax practice gives prior tax claim to the country of
activity. With regard to commodity taxation, efficiency requires taxa-
tion by country of destination, which leads to a distribution of base
different from that by taxation of origin. The essential point is that
taxation by destination tends to benefit the net commodity importing
country. Income taxation also now gives prior tax claim to the country
of activity which tends to be the factor importing country. Since the
net borrower tends to be a net importer of commodities as well as of
factors, both arrangements tend to be to its advantage. This may be a
desirable result but it should be noted that here as elsewhere efficiency
has its distributional implication.
VALUE-ADDED TAX, CONSUMPTION BASE. We have argued that a value-
added tax income base with ER-IT is neutral with regard to com-
modity flow, but has some distorting effects on factor flows. This is
owing primarily to the effects of the profit tax component of on
the mobile capital factor. Consider now a value-added tax, consumption
base Assuming again an appropriate ER-IT arrangement to apply,
such a tax will also be neutral with regard to commodity flows. Since
is equivalent (in the longer run at least) to an income tax with
capital income exempted, the distorting effect on capital flow will be
reduced or absent. It appears, therefore, that may be superior to
on world neutrality grounds.
EXPENDITURE BENEFITS. Benefits from public expenditures have been
disregarded. However, it should be added that what really matters are
the differentials in net benefit or burden rates that result from fiscal
operations.
To the extent that is matched by cost-reducing public services,
the ER-IT arrangement becomes inappropriate. The rebate would now
reduce export costs, while the import tax would raise the relative prices
of imports. To the extent that such services match a PT which is not
shifted, considerations of international neutrality might in fact require
a special tax on exports and a rebate on imports. The case for the
shifted PT, finally, again parallels that of VT1.
The GATT rules evidently disregard the public-services factor, which
may or may not be justified in the international context. In the context
of the United States discussion of fiscal federalism, however, such an
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oversight is not permissible. As noted above, the advantage of as a
state business tax is precisely that it can serve as a means of exporting
benefit taxes to the foreign consumer, if imposed on the origin basis.
NATURE OF ER-IT ADJUSTMENT. We have seen that a proper ER-IT
arrangement is crucial in certain cases to neutralize the effects of value-
added or profits taxes. It remains to take a closer look at what consti-
tutes a neutralizing adjustment.
We begin with and assume for the time being that its introduction
involves an absolute rise in prices. An ER-IT arrangement is then in
order. Determination of the export rebate is straightforward in principle.
The rebate should be an amount equal to the tax cost to be imputed
to the export product throughout its course of production.32 But a
question of principle arises with regard to the import duty. Here three
possibilities present themselves:
1. The compensating import duty may be designed to hold constant
the ratio of market prices of imported and domestic products. This re-
quires application of the VT1 rate to the duty-paid base of imports.
2. The compensating import duty may be designed to hold constant
the ratios of market prices as they would be in the absence of customs
duties. This requires application of the VT1 rate to the before-duty
basis and raises the market price of domestic relative to imported goods.
3. The compensating import duty may be designed to preserve the
absolute differential in the market price of foreign and domestic goods,
requiring a corresponding adjustment in the duty rate, defined with
regard to either base.33
321n practice, giving a correct rebate on exports is not simple, and European
experience has shown that there is scope here for overrebating and effectively sub-
sidizing exports. The earlier the stage in the productive process that such taxes are
imposed the more difficult it becomes to achieve an exact tax rebate and, incidentally,
to impose a compensating sales tax on imports which corresponds to the effective
tax paid on comparable domestically produced goods. Thus the operation of a
value-added or turnover tax on the destination principle in practice can be equiva-
lent to a tariff. U.S. exporters to the European market frequently adduce this as
an argument for the institution of a U.S. value-added tax affording the same possi-
bilities for discrimination. The discussion in this paper, however, assumes that
accurate export rebates are made.
LetMPd and MP. =marketprices of domestic and imported goods in absence
of tax,
and MI-" =pricesafter tax,
CPd and =costprices (in absence of tax and duties),
r =tariffrate,
t =VT1rate.
In the pre-tax position, we have
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From an efficiency point of view, nothing is to be said in favor of (3),
but the choice between (1) and (2) is more difficult. If we assume that
existing customs duties are an accepted fact, tax neutrality might be
defined in terms of procedure 1. But this is not very satisfactory on
efficiency grounds, where one should be free to reconsider the customs
arrangement. In this case procedure 2 is preferred, since it permits at
least a partial reduction in tariff distortions.34 Extension of this logic
would set the compensating import duty (positive or negative) equal
to the differential between domestic tax and tariff duty, but this is a
possibility which may be safely neglected. For the balance-of-payment
discussion procedure 1, which is in fact followed, is assumed to hold.
Additional complications arise if the ER-IT arrangement is applied
to other taxes. The consumption type of value-added tax again poses
no difficulty in priiiciple in assessing the proper level of ER, except in
cases where the firm produces for both export and domestic sales, and
capital outlays must be allocated between the two. Then problems arise
with regard to IT. If imposed on the assumption of zero domestic in-
vestment, foreign producers with net investment will be discriminated
against. If imposed at the average rate applicable to domestic producers
—and the rate will be the lower, the more rapid is expansion—distor-
tions may arise as between industries, and so forth.
If an ER-IT arrangement were to be added to the profits tax, deter-
mination of the appropriate export rebate rate for a mixed firm involves
allocation of profits between domestic and export sales. If the adjust-
ment were to be made on a unilateral and hence differential basis,
there would be the further difficulty of establishing comparative rates
for various countries, since many factors (e.g., depreciation rules) other
MPd CPd
(1 +
After tax, using method 1 we have
— (1+ t)CP,z-MPd
MPI' —(1+ e)(1 + —
After tax, using method 2 we have
(l+t)CPd>MPd
MP,' -(1+ r + MP1
After tax, using method 3 we have
(1+t)CPd<MPd
—(1+ + tCPdMP1
Tothe extent that old import duties have already been offset by exchange
rate adjustments, they do not involve a distortion, and procedure 1 is appropriate
on efficiency grounds.
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than statutory rates are involved. Also, in determining the differential
rate, different rates would have to be applied, depending on the desti-
nation of the export. Similar difficulties arise in defining the appropriate
import tax. Thus a corresponding treatment for PT might be very
difficult, even where theoretically justified.
Even in the simple case of implementing the proper levels of
ER-IT is no mean task. Moreover, it requires retention of a customs
apparatus which, hopefully, might be liquidated with tariff abolition.
This is the reason the Neumark Committee recommended that EEC
countries eventually move to a system of equal-rate value-added taxa-
tion by origin, leaving rate differentials to apply only for sales taxation
at the retail level.35
FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE BATES. All the preceding discussion has been
predicated on the assumption of ftxed.exchange rates. In what way may
the conclusions be modified if flexible exchange rates are allowed for?
No attempt is made here to follow through this difficult problem, but
some lines of thinking are suggested.
One oî our main conclusions was that commodity taxes are neutral,
(given fixed factor supplies in each country), if imposed on the destina-
tion principle (VT with ER-IT arrangement) but nonneutral if on the
origin principle (VT with no ER-IT). Within the context of flexible
exchange rates, however, even a differential VT without ER-IT (source
principle) may not interfere with domestic factor allocation. Introduc-
tion of such a tax to country A would penalize exports and stimulate
imports, leading to a larger supply of A's currency on the international
exchange market and a smaller supply of foreign currencies. A's exchange
rate would thereby decline until the price of A's product (including the
VT) expressed in terms of the foreign currencies would be the same as
in. the pre-tax situation. Devaluation of A's currency would offset the
commodity tax.36 Introduction of an ER-IT arrangement would then
restore the exchange rate possibly to its pre-tax level, and the situation
would remain neutral. While, by the same token, the exchange-rate
adjustment may be said to neutralize a uniform ad valorem tariff, this,
of course, does not mean to say it would neutralize a differential tariff.
Report of the Fiscal and Financial Committee of the EEC on Tax Harmoniza-
tion (Neumark Committee), 1962.
An argument developed by J. Tinbergen (see Communauté Euro péene du Charbon
et de l'Acier: Haute Autorité Commission-Taxes, report submitted to the High Au-
thority, Apr. 8, 1953). See also Carl S. Shoup's comments, "Taxation Aspects of
International Economic Integration," Travaux de l'Institut International de Finances
Publiques, Frankfurt, 195a.
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The point to be kept in mind is that the value-added tax analogy is to a
uniform ad vallorem tariff ease only.
The second main conclusion was that an unshifted profits tax is
neutral, with respect to international capital flows, if imposed on the
residence principle. The nonneutrality arising from a profits tax on
source-of-income (country of activity) basis might also be mitigated
by a flexible exchange-rate system. Introduction of such a tax in country
A will encourage capital outflow, reduce capital inflow, and have an
adverse impact on A's balance of payments as in the commodity tax case.
A's exchange rate will again decline until the after-tax profit rate in A,
expressed in terms of foreign currencies, approximates the pre-tax situa-
tion. The exchange rate adjustment again neutralizes the tax on factor
income.
C. BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS ASPECTS
In the preceding section, various taxes were evaluated from the point
of view of world efficiency in resource and commodity flows. We now
turn to a more national point of view, looking at the effects of various
tax changes on a country's balance of payments. A distinction will be
drawn between: (1) short-run trade effects, including price and income
effects; (2) structural capital flow effects, involving changes in the alloca-
tion of capital resources between production for export and for domestic
use; and (3) effects on international capital flows. In dealing with the
latter effects, longer-term capital movements only are considered. The
problem of short-term capital movements is a matter of monetary rather
than of tax policy and is passed over here.
As before, our primary concern is with the substitution of a value-
added tax of the income type for a profits tax PT, but certain other
changes will be considered as well.
Short-Run Trade Effects of Substitution: 1. Price Effects
Consider first a period not long enough to affect capital formation
in the export industries. However, there may be trade effects due to
changes in import or in export prices. Such effects may result from
changes in relative prices or from changes in income; and they will
differ, depending on what one assumes regarding the short-run shiftinga7
of the corporation tax.
Here,as throughout, the term not shifted as it appears in the subheading means
not shifted in the shc'rt-run sense as defined in footnote 1, above, and is to be dis-
tinguished from long.•run shifting which may come about through capital adjust-
ments.
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PT NOT SHIFTED. We assume first that all prices (product and factor)
are determined in such a way that the short-run effect of the corpora-
tion tax is to reduce profits. As is substituted for PT, there will
be a change in the relative prices of products sold at home and abroad,
as a rebate is granted on the latter under VT. However, what matters for
balance-of-payments purposes is the change in the absolute level of
export and domestic prices resulting from the tax substitution. Whereas
the absolute (as distinct from relative) price change did not matter
in the closed-economy context, we note again that it now assumes
strategic importance.
Suppose, first, that substitution of for PT raises domestic prices
by the rate of Considering the nature of wage and price policy
in our economy, this is a reasonable assumption. Money wages are not
likely to fall, nor is VT. likely to be absorbed (under these conditions)
in reduced profit margins. Factor costs and hence export prices net of
rebate remain unchanged. Thus, exports will be unaffected. Assuming
that domestic demand is maintained in real terms through appropriate
fiscal or monetary measures, demand for imports will be unchanged as
well. Since import prices are subject to a compensatory tax, they are
raised along with domestic prices, leaving relative prices unchanged.
Hence imports are unchanged as well. There are no price effects.
Next, let us suppose (if somewhat unrealistically) that substitution
of for PT leaves the market price of domestic products unchanged.
In this case, the tax wedge driven by the value-added tax results in
reduced factor costs. As shown in the preceding discussion of the closed-
economy case, factor incomes (in money as well as real terms) available
for expenditure are unchanged by the substitution, as the gain in profits
(from repeal of the profits tax) offsets the loss of factor income (due to
value-added tax). The cost of export goods (which are exempted from
has fallen, along with factor prices. If international product prices
are given by world-market conditions, it will lead to increased export
profits and substitution of export production for domestic sales produc-
tion. Such switching will be possible without capital changes and hence
must be distinguished from longer-run structural effects noted below.
On the import side, no compensating tax is called for in this case
(on grounds of efficient world commodity flows), since the relationship
of domestic to import prices has not been changed by the substitution.
No immediate favorable effects from the import side will ensue. A
compensating import duty would not be justified on international neu-
trality grounds and indeed would give an undue advantage to the
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imposing country. By the same token, that country would find it advan-
tageous on balance-of-payments grounds.
What constituted. a more or less trivial matter in the closed-economy
case, i.e., the change in absolute prices by which the change in real
income shares resulting from the tax substitution is brought about,
assumes considerabile importance in the open-economy setting. Tax sub-
stitution with rising domestic prices would carry the adverse balance-of-
payments effects of appreciation on imports, were it not for the
compensating tax. Substitution with falling export prices, in turn, car-
ries the favorable export effects of depreciation, provided of course that
no compensating adjustment is made by the importing country abroad.
PT SHIFTED. If PT were shifted in the short-run sense (we again assume
shifting for domestic products subject to only limited import competi-
tion, but no shifting on exports), various adjustment patterns might
occur. One question is whether PT shifting took the form of increase
in absolute or in relative prices. Let us assume the former and postulate
also that, under conditions which permit PT shifting, introduction of
will also be reflected in absolute price rise. Another question is
whether the assumption of PT shifting as PT is introduced need imply
a similar assumption of unshifting with PT removal. This need not be,
but let us suppose that it is.
Under these conditions, which seem reasonable, substitution of
f or PT leaves domestic prices unchanged, as the price increase due to
introduction of on the average tends to offset the decline due to
removal of PT.38 Net profits will then remain unchanged on domestic
sales, but (owing to the export rebate) increase in export industries.
In the longer run this will lead to structural capital flows into exports,
but in the short run higher export profits are enjoyed. This will lead
to substitution of export for domestic market production within the
confines of existing capital and thus have favorable balance-of-payments
effects. Such would be the case, particularly if world demand were in-
finitely elastic, and less so if price reduction is needed to increase exports.
Since the substitution of is accompanied also by a compensating im-
port tax, a favorable import effect will result as well. The basic change,
inherent in the substitution, lies in the addition of the ER-IT arrange-
ment which, of course, has favorable price effects.
88Ifremoval of PT does not lead to unshifting, the favorable price effects here
noted do not occur. The structural capital flow effect is still antiexports, and the
international capital flow effect is highly favorable to the balance of payments.
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Short-Run Trade Effects of VTL—PT Substitution: 2. Income Effects
PP NOT SHIFTED. Substitution of a general tax on factor incomes for a
partial tax on corporate profits, and the resulting change in income
distribution may affect the aggregate level of expenditures as well as
its distribution between domestic and imported goods.
Aggregate demand may be affected in two ways as PT is replaced by
Removal of PT may raise investment, due to favorable rate-of-
return effect. At the same time, consumption demand is likelydecline.
The fraction of the tax absorbed in reduced corporate saving is cur-
tailed; disposable personal income is redistributed regressively,i.e.,
toward taxpayers with lower marginal propensities to consume; and if
is reflected in higher prices, money illusion on the part of consumers
may lead to reflection of the entire tax in reduced consumption. If the
net effect on investment and consumption demand is restrictive, favora-
ble balance-of-payments effects may result, either because of declining
prices or declining real income. If the net effect is expansionary, short-
run balance-of-payments effects may be unfavorable on the same
grounds.
It may be assumed, of course, that income effects would not be per-
mitted to occur, because government action would be taken to maintain
full employment income and to prevent price changes—at least changes
beyond the price increase needed to reflect the value-added tax. In this
case, balance-of-payments effects, especially if short-run capital flows
are taken into consideration, will depend on the particular type of
stabilization action taken.
PT SHIFTED. If PT were shifted and then unshifted when removed,
income effects would be much reduced in importance. Except for minor
effects, which may result from tax exemption of the export sector, the
investment and consumption responses of which may differ from those
of industry at large, aggregate demand will be unchanged.
Domestic Capital Effects of V Ti-PT Substitution: 1. Structural
As noted before, we consider two types of domestic capital effects.
The first includes "structural" effects involving redirection of domes-
tic investment as between production for exports and production for
home markets.
PT NOT SHIFTED. Repeal of PT does not affect relative profitability
of domestic and export industries. Introduction of with ER-IT
arrangement similarly leaves relative profitability unchanged. The tax
substitution on balance increases profitability in both sectors, at least
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if introduction of the value-added tax raises domestic prices. If domestic
prices remain constant and factor prices fall, the profitability of exports
is increased and domestic capital will flow from home to export produc-
tion.39 This implies a long-run favorable export effect on the balance
of payments which, in time, comes to supersede the previously noted
short-run gain from substituting export for domestic sales on the basis
of the given capital stock. However, upward adjustment in domestic
prices in response to the value-added tax is the more likely effect of the
VT% substitution; th.e internal capital flow, therefore, is likely to be minor.
PT SHIFTED. Assuming that PT were shifted onto domestic sales only
and is unshifted with removal, its repeal increases export profitability.
Imposition of with ER-IT arrangement affects profitability in
neither sector so that the substitution increases relative export profita-
bility, giving rise to capital flow from domestic production industries to
export industries. The balance of payments is improved on the export
side.
Domestic Capital Effects of Substitution: 2. Aggregate
The second domestic capital effect that has been noted is the effect
on the total levels of domestic capital formation.
PT NOT SHIFTED. As just noted, substitution of for PT raises
profitability in both sectors. This may give rise to an increased over-all
rate of capital formation. If so, the balance of payments will be affected
favorably through increased exports (depending again on cost and de-
mand conditions) and unfavorably through increased import demand
due to increased income. The net effect on the balance of payments
through faster growth may be in either direction.
PT SHIFTED. Aggregate as well as structural capital effects are much
reduced in importance if PT is shifted and is unshifted with removal.
International Capital Flow Effects of Substitution
We now turn to the effect of substitution of for PT on inter-
national capital flows, probably the most important type of capital
effect. As noted before, we consider long-run flows in response to changes
in investment yields, rather than short-run monetary effects.
PT NOT SHIFTED. Removal of PT will raise private returns to invest-
ment in the United States relative to those in other countries, and there
will be a strong incentive given to investment in the U.S. American
The magnitude of flow will depend on long-run cost conditions in the export
industrieswell as OIL the elasticity of world demand for exports.
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investors may now prefer to invest in their own country rather than
abroad, while foreign capital may be similarly attracted to the United
States. The higher the foreign profits tax rate is, the stronger this
incentive will be. Similarly, there will be a tendency to remit to and
reinvest in the United States a higher proportion of the earnings of
U.S. securities owned abroad.
The conclusion that a PT reduction in the United States has a favor-
able balance-of-payments effect on capital account holds, whatever the
relative levels of PT are in the U.S. and abroad. At the same time,
from the point of view of world allocation of capital, reduction in the
U.S. rate is efficiency-increasing if the differential is reduced but is dis-
torting if it goes beyond that. To the extent that there are profits taxes
abroad, repeal of the U.S. tax would be damaging to world efficiency.
Table 1 shows the taxes payable on 100 units of investment income
arising from investment made in the United States, in country A with
corporate profits tax of 30 per cent, and country B with a tax rate of
60 per cent, both with the 1963 U.S. corporate income tax of 52 per
cent (with the foreign tax credit) and the United States with a zero
tax on corporate profits. Table 2 shows the ratios of after-tax income
from investments made in the United States to that from investments
made in each of the other countries, for each type of investment situa-
tion. The tax loads in each situation are shown for investments made
in both branches and subsidiaries of U.S. corporations and for both
distributed and retained earnings. The after-tax income ratios indicate
the strength of the tax incentives to invest in the United States or
abroad. If the ratio is greater than unity, there is a tax inducement to
invest at home; if less than one, to invest abroad. If the ratio is equal
to one, the investor is indifferent in the choice between U.S. and foreign
investment so far as tax considerations are concerned. Comparison of
the ratios in the two situations before and after the tax change in the
United States indicates the changes in the incentives to home invest-
ment. Since we assume that all value-added taxes in the United States
and abroad operate on the destination principle, the tax load on the
product is independent of the location of the U.S. investment in pro-
ducing operations. Of course, that is not true of tariffs, and there remain
tariff inducements to home or foreign investment.
It is evident that abolition of the U.S. corporate income tax, while
capital-importing countries maintain the same rates as before, would
greatly increase (so far as U.S. investors are concerned) the profitability
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measure would severely impair the degree of neutrality of the present
situation, under which all U.S. investment income wherever it arises
is subject to the present U.S. corporate income tax rate unless earnings
are retained in the subsidiary abroad or the foreign tax is higher than
the U.S. rate. Abolition of the U.S. profits tax would increase the ratio
of after-tax earnings (U.S. to foreign) by from 40 to some 130 per cent.
The tax-burden differential as between investments located in different
countries would widen, since the effect of the U.S. rate of 52 per cent
together with the foreign tax credit had served to narrow the gap. U.S.
investment in the new situation would be discouraged relatively more in
the high-tax jurisdictions.
It should also be noted that the greatest diversionary effect would
take place with respect to the retention of earnings abroad. The present
tax incentive to the retention of earnings abroad, particularly in low-tax
jurisdictions, would disappear and it is probable that in these circum-
stances a larger proportion of foreign earnings would be remitted to the
United States. The combination of a reduced rate of direct investment
outflows, and a reduction in the proportion of foreign earnings reinvested
abroad would act to improve greatly the U.S. balance of payments in the
short run. At the same time, such a development would considerably
slow down the rate of growth of U.S. capital in foreign countries and
thus the return flow of income therefrom in future years. To the extent
that much of this foreign investment diverted to the United States
would have been made in lines of production that compete with and
displace U.S exports, and to the extent that increased home investment
leads to lower costs of production in the export- and import-competing
industries, the balance of payments in the long run would not be ad-
versely affected.
Other indirect effects on the balance of payments resulting from the
tax-induced diversions of capital flows may be favorable or unfavorable
depending on the structural effects on the trade balance. A slowing
down of American investment in foreign sources of raw materials and
intermediate products could, in the long run, worsen the terms of trade
and raise the costs of domestic production. The nonneutrality of the
pattern of taxes, domestic and foreign, on U.S. investment would mean
that American capitalists would be encouraged to invest at home
up to the point where the gross rate of return is well below that of
foreign countries. In other words, investment at home will be preferred
to foreign investment even though real costs may be much higher here.
Although this represents a world welfare loss, it might not be a loss
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to the United States as a nation for, had the investment moved abroad,
part of the earnings would be taken in taxes by the recipient country.
However, such a structural effect might have serious consequences for
the U.S. competitive position in world trade in the long run, unless the
increased domestic capital formation leads to technological improve-
ments of a cost-decreasing and demand-increasing nature.
One undesirable feature of the tax change would be the retardation
of private direct investment in the underdeveloped countries. With a
zero profits tax rate in the United States there could be no way of
maintaining capital flows to the low-income areas short of large
sidies. The underdeveloped countries heavily dependent on private U.S.
investment for their capital formation would be encouraged to reduce
their own corporate income tax rates to their own fiscal embarrassment.
With the natural reluctance to invest in those countries, however, even
though net returns may be higher than in the U.S., there would remain
a bias in favor of investment in the United States. Abolition of the U.S.
corporate profits tax would be analogous to a "beggar-my-neighbor"
tariff or devaluation policy.
PT SHIFTED. If the profits tax is shifted onto domestic sales and
becomes unshifted with removal, the effect of the tax substitution on
capital and investment flows will be much less pronounced. Removal
of the profits tax will not greatly affect the profitability of home invest-
ment by U.S. investors. This makes the substitution less advantageous
from a U.S. balance-of-payments point of view, and, by the same token,
less harmful from a world allocation of capital point of view.
Substitution of for PT
We now leave the substitution and briefly consider certain
other tax changes. To begin with, how will the results differ if a value-
added tax of the consumption type VT6 is used to replace PT, rather
than the previously considered
PT NOT SHIFTED. For the substitution, we noted absence of
price effects if is reflected in higher absolute prices (the more likely
case) but favorable effects if prices do not rise. We also noted favorable
capital-flow effects. For VT6 the same conclusions hold regarding price
effects. The international capital-flow effect would be even more favor-
able, because VT6 (as distinct from excludes capital income from
the tax. By the same token structural effects on internal capital flow
to export industries would be even weaker.
PT SHIFTED. For the substitution, we recorded favorable price
120ALLOCATION, DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
effects. Much the same holds for a substitution. International
capital-flow effects would not be significant for either substitution.
Structural capital flow effects toward the export industry are again
positive but somewhat weaker than in the substitution, since profit
income would escape the tax.
In all, it appears that the balance-of-payment effects of the
substitution do not differ greatly from those of the substitution.
Export Rebate and Import Compensation Tax for PT
So far, we have explored the balance-of-payments implications of
substituting a VT with ER-IT for PT, the general conclusion being
that the balance-of-payments effects of such a substitution would he
favorable. We now examine briefly to what extent unfavorable balance-
of-payments effects of PT may be avoided by attaching an export
rebate-import tax arrangement to it.
PT NOT SHIFTED. So far as international capital-flow effects of PT are
concerned, the obvious remedy as noted above is to tax capital at resi-
dence rates.4° Giving an export credit would help (1) by reducing the
average differential and (2) by directing investment into industries
which are foreign-exchange earning. However, the credit needed just
to cancel adverse balance-of-payment effects of PT may exceed or fall
short of the differential rate, depending on, the response of capital flows
and indirect trade effects.
Next, consider the rebate as an offset to total domestic investment
effects of PT on the export industry and hence on exports. A full credit
(i.e., for the entire rate differential) on profits from export sales would
help, but again it might well go much beyond the needed correction.
The resulting redirection of internal capital from domestic to export
production could put the exporter in a stronger competitive position
than if there had been no differential. Theoretically, a lesser rebate rate
could be devised which would induce a structural flow just sufficient
to offset the "total investment" effect in the export sector, but it would
hardly be worthwhile since the effect is likely to be relatively small.
PT SHIFTED. If PT is shifted onto domestic goods, the initial price
effects will leave exports unchanged while raising imports. Introduction
of the export rebate would have no initial price effect on exports, but
the import tax would raise import prices thus reversing the initial rise
in imports.
Adverse capital-flow effects of PT were less than they were in the
SeeSect. B under Factor Mobility Without Commodity Flows.
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no-shifting case, but the export industry suffered through structural
capital flows. A PT credit on export sales and a compensating tax on
imports would cancel those effects. The capital effects (as distinct from
price effects) of adding ER-IT are the same for either shifting assump-
tion.
The preceding conclusions apply to the effects of introducing the
ER-IT arrangement to an existing PT. The reader might want to com-
bine these considerations with our preceding conclusions regarding sub-
stitution of PT, excluding ER-IT, for VT and see what happens if PT
with ER-IT is substituted for VT.
Substitution of for Individual Income Tax
Suppose now that is introduced not as a substitute for PT but
for the personal income tax YT. Assuming YT to be proportional and
recalling our earlier statement of equivalence between and a pro-
portional general income tax, it would seem that the substitution leaves
matters unchanged. However, substitution of VT1 brings with it ER-IT,
and the outcome depends on the response of absolute prices.
Suppose, first, that absolute prices rise by the amount of value-added
tax. The effect thereof on exports and imports is neutralized by ER-IT.
Consider, however, a situation where the substitution leaves the domes-
tic price level unchanged, the wedge simply replacing the YT
wedge between market price (gross receipts of the firm) and disposable
factor income remaining after deducting personal income tax. Intro-
duction of IT now raises the relative price of imports, and ER reduces
the cost of exports. Favorable trade effects result, the situation being
exactly the same (except for favorable capital-flow effects which are
now absent) as in the previously considered substitution for the profits
tax.4'
The result, as in preceding instances, thus depends entirely on the
price-change assumption. As noted before, the downward rigidity of
money wages cannot be overlooked, nor does it seem reasonable to
expect that the tax would be reflected readily in reduced profits. It
seems reasonable, therefore, to expect that favorable price effects will
be absent or of slight importance.
Addition of
The preceding reasoning may be applied readily to consider what
happens if is added to rather than substituted for existing taxes.
Let us suppose this is done in a full-employment context and that the
"Whatmatters is merely introduction of VT1, it being immaterial whether PT
or VT is replaced.
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increase in revenue is accompanied by a corresponding rise in public
expenditures. Also, suppose the increase in government expenditures is
as import intensive as is the replaced private demand.
If introduction of VL leaves domestic prices unchanged while lower-
ing factor cost, ER-IT will have favorable price effects on commodity
trade and on the balance of payments. If, as is more likely, the tax
raises domestic prices, there will be no such effects. The result is very
similar to that of substituting for the VT.42
Summary of Conclusions
Our major conclusions on the balance-of-payments effects of a VTrPT
substitution are summarized in Table 3.
1. Consider first a substitution of for PT, and assume that the
corporation income tax PT was not shifted in the short-run sense. Sub-
stitution of for PT may then be expected to have powerful and
favorable effects on the balance of payments through its effects on
international capital movement. Short-run trade effects on the balance
of payments will be neutral or favorable, depending on whether or not
domestic prices rise, the former being the more likely situation. If do-
mestic prices do not rise, a flow of domestic capital into export indus-
tries will add a favorable longer-run structural effect to the short-run
price effect on exports.
Short-run income effects are likely to be of minor importance, but
on balance may reduce imports and improve the balance of payments.
In all, the effects on the balance of payments are clearly favorable, with
the effect on capital flow probably the most important item. The latter
will be the more favorable the higher the rates of profits taxes are in the
other major capital supplying and importing countries.
If we assume that the corporation tax on domestic products (but not
exports) is shifted in the short-run sense, and that removal will result
in corresponding unshifting, the short-run trade effects of substituting
VT on the balance of payments are much less pronounced and longer-
run domestic capital allocation and international capital movements
will be little affected.43
42Thisis the case in the context of a full-employment assumption. If this assump-
tion is dropped, employment and income effects may differ, leading to different
balance-of-payments repercussions.
43If,however, the profits tax had been shifted onto exports as well as domestic
products, there will be export-increasing price effects with little effect on capital
allocation and flows, on the assumption that no unshifting of foreign profits taxes
from export-competing goods results. If foreign competitors are forced to unshift
the profits taxes they pay, there will be short-run price effects on trade but a longer-








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.ALLOCATION, DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
2. Substitution of a value-added tax for personal income tax, or
simple addition of a value-added tax will have favorable price effects,
only under the unlikely assumption of wage reduction or profits squeeze.
3. Addition of an BR-IT arrangement to PT will have favorable
balance-of-payments effects by inducing structural capital flow from
domestic industries to exports and by raising the price of imported goods.
However, ER-IT will not offset the adverse international capital-flow
effects of a PT which is not shifted.
Tax Effects on Export Competition
The problems dealt with in the preceding pages may be approached
in a somewhat different fashion by asking whether exporters in a high
tax rate country are "handicapped" vis-à-vis their brethren in low rate
countries.
PROFITS TAX. Consider, first, exporters in a country with high PT
rates. In the absence of short-run shifting, the excess rate was shown
to have an adverse total capital effect, as well as to discourage capital
imports and induce capital outflow. Thereby, capital formation in the
high-rate country tends to be retarded, and export as well as domestic
industries will suffer. Assuming perfect capital markets, the net return
on capital in the high-rate country for both export and domestic indus-
tries will be equated eventually with returns abroad, but this is of little
comfort to existing exporters who, like the old investor in the high-rate
country, suffer a capital loss. If exporters rely on internal funds to
expand foreign markets, the tax imposes a greater disadvantage. How-
ever, this may not hold for earnings from foreign subsidiaries where
deferral applies. Finally, if PT is shifted on domestic sales, the disad-
vantage of the exporter is even greater, as the export industry must now
contend with adverse structural capital flows to domestic industries.
VALUE-ADDED TAX. Exporters in a country with high rates are
not handicapped in foreign markets, provided a proper ER-IT system
applies. Nothing is to be gained or lost, from the point of view of export
competition, by either raising or lowering the rate. The same applies
for a high rate, provided ER is figured properly so as to allow for
investment deductions at earlier stages of export production.
COMPOSITION OF TAX STRUCTURE. it is sometimes suggested that ex-
porters in country A are at a disadvantage relative to those in B if the
ratio of PT to VT yield is higher in A. This is incorrect as a
proposition. What matters, obviously, is the relative level of PT rates
and, assuming proper adjustments to PT, nothing else. The PT to VT
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yield ratio, therefore, is relevant only for countries with an equal ratio
of total yield to GNP, and even then the comparison is made better
by direct reference to PT rates.
This reasoning, of course, needs to be qualified where the ER-IT
adjustment deviates from the proper level. If VT differentials, before
introduction of ER-IT, were compensated for by exchange-rate adjust-
ments, subsequent introduction of ER-IT may result in a gain, and the
absolute level of VT rates becomes a significant factor. Similar consid-
erations hold where ER-IT adjustments overcompensate for other rea-
Sons; but unless such errors in ER-IT levels exist, it is only the absolute
differential in PT rates that matters.
D. PRESENT SITUATION OF THE UNITED STATES
It has been argued, particularly by businessmen, that the U.S. exporter
is at a disadvantage vis-à-vis his foreign competitor owing to the high
corporate income tax in this country. The argument is based on the
claim that those countries which are the major competitors with the
U.S. rely largely on sales taxes, which are rebated on their exports.
Replacement of the corporate income tax by a value-added tax, with
export rebates, is suggested as a redress for this competitive imbalance.
Having considered the theoretical aspects of the argument, what are
the facts of the case?
If we consider the six countries of the European Common Market,
together with the United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan, we find (see
Table 4, column 1) that six of the countries (France, West Germany, the
United Kingdom, Canada, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands) have stat-
utory tax rates on undistributed profits not greatly out of line with
those in the United States (see Table 4, column 1). If we allow for the
rate reduction now pending, the U.S. rate is on the low side, except for
the comparison with Belgium, Italy, and Japan. In column 3, two further
adjustments are made. Certain other taxes which fall on corporate
profits, such as net wealth, capital taxes, local surcharges, and (in the
United States) state corporation profit taxes, are included. Also, certain
major modifications to the statutory rates, which are necessary to arrive
at an approximation of the effective tax rates, are allowed for, such as
accelerated depreciation, investment allowances, and other forms of
deductions and profits exemptions. The general picture is not changed,
the U.S. position being more favorable in some cases and less so in
others. On the whole, it appears that the foreign effective rates on re-
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NOTESTO TABLE(concluded)
CExciudestheRicchezza-mobiletax,which is paid by corporations
but nor again imposed on individual recipients of dividends.
dExcludesthe income tax (standard rate), which is paid by corpo-
rations but not again imposed on individual recipients of dividends.
eselective purchase tax at varying rates.
applicable to profits in excess of 2 million yen.
8Varjes by provinces, rate applies to Ontario.
rate reduction proposed in the House tax—cut bill (H.R.
8363, passed Sept. 9, 1963, 88th Cong., 1st seas.; at the time of
writing in the Senate Finance Committee).
Fordistributed earnings, the U.S. position as shown in columns 2 and
4 is less favorable. The United Kingdom, West Germany, and Italy have,
to some degree, an integrated corporate and personal income tax system,
whereas the United States does not. This would be accentuated by repeal
of the dividend credit. However, only in the case of the United Kingdom
and Italy does this lead to a significant excess rate in the United States
over foreign rates on distributed earnings.
All the countries considered, except the United States and the United
Kingdom, impose national sales, value-added, or turnover taxes in addi-
tion to the profits taxes discussed above. These taxes are generally
rebated on exports with compensating sales taxes imposed on imports.
There is considerable rate variation, with higher rates on luxury goods
and low or zero taxes on necessities such as foodstuffs. However, the
typical rates for manufactured goods, as shown in the table, are very
much higher than the value-added tax rate (around 8 per cent), which
would be needed in the United States to yield the same tax revenue as
the present corporation income tax.
Suggestions for the harmonization of fiscal systems of the Common
Market countries44 include adoption of an equal rate profits tax (about
50 per cent on retained earnings and 15 to 25 per cent on distributed
profits) and the abolition of wealth taxes on business. Also recommended
is the conversion of turnover sales taxes to the value-added type and
their eventual rate equalization to permit their imposition on the origin
principle.
Rebates for exports going outside the Common Market countries and
compensatory taxes on imports into the Common Market countries
would continue. Equal value-added taxes would be combined with low
but unequal retail sales taxes to permit adjustments in national tax
See reference in footnote 35, above.
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revenues. It would thus appear that the more significant difference in
tax burdens on profits of U.S. and foreign corporations exist with respect
to the lower foreign taxes on distributed earnings (by split rates or
integration of corporate and personal income taxes or under a schedular
system), which prevail in some foreign countries. This difference would
become even more prevalent if the Common Market countries generally
adopt the split-rate type of corporate income taxation. However, differ-
ences in the effective rates on retained earnings are more important,
so far as the financial ability of the corporation to expand is concerned,
and here we have seen the U.S. corporation is not seriously handicapped.
Moreover, U.S. exporters are not subject to any value-added tax in the
United States and thus compete on equal terms with foreign products,
unless, of course, foreign exports are overrebated.
Introduction of the tax credit for domestic investment and more
liberal depreciation treatment also combine to reduce the effective U.S.
corporation income tax on businesses producing for export. Foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. parent companies, which are engaged in the sale
of U.S. products abroad are able to take advantage of low foreign tax
rates under the U.S. system of tax deferral on foreign income, which is
specifically permitted (with certain limitations) under the Revenue Act
of 1962.
Policy Conclusions
Policy conclusions on the international aspects of our problem depend
on whose view is taken.
From the international point of view, efficiency in international trade
and resource use is what matters. In this respect, the position of the
United States tax structure relative to that of other tax structures is
reasonably satisfactory. While it is true that some of our major competi-
tors in Europe place considerable reliance on value-added taxes while
we do not, this is beside the point. Our or capital share is
not depressed by such a tax, nor is theirs, since an ER-IT arrangement
applies. The unilateral existence of with ER-IT in some parts of
the world is no cause for nonneutrality; nor are mere differences in the
direct versus indirect tax shares in the tax structures of various coun-
tries. The relevant question is, by how much the absolute levels of
profit tax rates, or cost taxes not subject to ER-IT, differ. Existing PT
differentials with West European countries are minor, especially if the
pending legislation is passed, in so far as retained earnings are concerned,
but in some cases there is a major disadvantage for distributed earnings.
Drastic action, such as substitution of a for PT, would create an
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opposite differential in our favor, much in excess of that which now
exists against us. International nonneutrality as between developed
countries would be increased, not reduced. What may be more im-
portant, any existing and desirable nonneutrality in favor of under-
developed countries would be eliminated.
To look at the matter from the narrow national point of view of U.S.
balance-of-paymentsinterests only, a number of tax adjustments can
be suggested that would be helpful. Reduction of PT, substitution of
VT1 with ER-IT, addition of an ER-IT arrangement to PT, would all
be helpful. Eliminating tax deferral would also serve this purpose, at
least in the shorter run. While it is easy to point out that these things
would be helpful in the narrow sense of U.S. balance-of-payments inter-
est, it does not follow that they should be done. U.S. policy, over the
years, has placed great emphasis on the desirability of establishing an
international order which will permit a freer flow of world trade. It can
hardly afford to scuttle these objectives by an indiscriminate policy
of tax dumping, without regard for free trade arid the orderly develop-
ment of tax policies both here and abroad. If a longer view is taken,
this applies to the narrow point of view of national interest as well.
The problem, then, is not to determine which tax change would be
most helpful on ballance-of-payments grounds, but to examine what
changes (including nontax as well as tax measures) would be most
helpful and least in conflict with these other objectives. This involves a
decision (1) on the relative merits of interference or noninterference
with capital as against commodity flows, and (2) on which adjustments
are best designed to meet either purpose, while raising least objections
on other grounds.
It does not seem likely that a drastic move from PT to VT1 is the
proper solution, unless one were to argue for this on grounds of domestic
tax reform, in which case, fuller taxation of retained earnings would be
called for as well. Nor do we feel that application of an ER-IT arrange-
ment is the proper solution. The technical difficulties of doing that would
be considerable, and the relief obtained by applying ER-IT to the rate
differential would seem to be minor.
COMMENT
CARL S. SHOtJP, Columbia University
This represents a division of labor with Lawrence Krause, who is con-
centrating on the second part of the paper, "International Aspects."
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These comments add nothing to the main themes of Part 1; they raise
only a few subsidiary questions regarding the transition problem, the
efficiency discussion of a profits tax limited to corporations, and the
question of what tax is appropriate to finance government services that
reduce all costs equally.
1.If an income tax is replaced by a value-added tax of the income
type, assets already in existence at the time of the change are said to be
favored relative to assets produced later. The argument given is: (1)
"capital goods produced henceforth will be subject to and this
will be equivalent to a tax on capital income," which is of course correct;
and (2) "earnings derived from capital assets already in existence are
freed from tax as YT is dropped and thus become the beneficiaries of a
capital gain," a statement that seems incorrect, or at least ambiguous.
Under the value-added tax (income type), earnings from existing capital
assets are not freed from tax; they are subject to tax on net profit after
depreciation, just as they had been under the income tax. Earnings
from new assets will be treated similarly. For example, let us consider
a business firm that engages no labor, but sells a service by wearing out
a capital asset. Under the income tax, its tax base will be sales less
depreciation, and under the value-added tax (income type) its tax base
will be the same. A competing firm that purchases its capital asset
after the value-added tax has been introduced will likewise pay value-
added tax on its sales less depreciation. As I understand the issue being
posed, I am unable to see a need, "in order to have a full equivalence
for YT," for to be "combined with an income tax on earnings from
old capital," or for depreciation on "old" capital goods to be disallowed.
If the value-added tax is of the consumption type, a transition problem
does arise. Owners of old assets will complain that they are getting no
deduction at all, under a regime that disallows depreciation but allows
subtraction of the cost of an asset in the year of its purchase. These
owners will be competing with firms that, buying new assets after the
value-added tax is introduced, obtain full deduction. It was this argu-
ment that persuaded the Tax Mission to Japan, in its second report,
to recommend, as a partial reduction in disparity of treatment, that
depreciation be allowed as a deduction with respect to assets in existence
at the time the tax was introduced.'
1SecondReport on Taxation, by the Shoup Mission, Sept. 1950, P. 17.
Elimination of the disparity would have required an immediate subtraction of the
net value of existing capital assets at the time of introduction of the tax (with a
suitable carry-over).
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2. The efficiency discussion of a profits tax limited to corporations
seems to imply that the corporation tax results in straight double taxa-
tion—or extra taxation—of all corporate profits, so that an investor
in an unincorporated firm, who pays only the personal income tax on
his investment income, is compared with a corporate stockholder who is
deemed, if there is no shifting, to be paying both personal income tax
and corporate income tax on his investment income. In fact, however,
since undistributed corporate income is not subject to personal income
tax, the corporate tax is in large part a substitute for the personal
income tax, sometimes a more than adequate substitute, sometimes less,
depending in part on the capital gains and losses provisions. Some mis-
understanding may therefore arise when so much of the efficiency anal-
ysis is carried on in terms of the corporate tax's "leaving other industries
[unincorporated-firm industries] tax free." In the horizontal equity dis-
cussion, on the other hand, this issue is specifically mentioned; I am
suggesting therefore that it be specifically mentioned also in an analysis
of the efficiency problem.
3. When benefits from government expenditure are introduced into
the analysis, it is said that neutralization is achieved, when "public
services tend to reduce all costs equally," by using a value-added tax
of the income type. I am not sure I follow this argument; it seems to me
that the income type of value-added tax is appropriate only if the gov-
ernment service is of a kind that reduces the cost of producing by capital
equipment while not reducing the cost of producing by direct labor.
That kind of a government service, which amounts to a reduction in the
interest charge, may then be offset by a tax that impinges on interest,
namely, a tax of the income type. If, on the other hand, the government
service reduces wage cost only—that is, reduces the amount of labor
that needs to be privately hired and privately paid, for any task what-
ever—it reduces, by an equal percentage, (a) the total cost of producing
by direct labor, and (b) the total cost of producing (somewhat more
product) by labor plus waiting—assuming that the interest rate remains
unchanged. The appropriate charge for such a service is a tax,
that likewise does not discriminate between producing a certain amount
now and producing somewhat more later.
LAWRENCE B. KRAUSE, Brookings Institution
I will concentrate on some of the international aspects studied. The
authors have investigated two proposed tax changes; the substitution
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of an indirect value-added tax of the income variety,1 having an export
rebate-import compensation tax (ER-IT) feature for the direct cor-
porate profits tax and, alternatively, the grafting of an ER-IT feature
onto the existing corporate profits tax. The proposed changes are exam-
ined as to their implications for world efficiency and their consequences
for the balance of payments.
Recognizing that the incidence of the profits tax plays a crucial role
in deducing the consequences of the proposals, the authors proceed with
the analysis by first assuming on the one hand that there is no short-run
shifting of the profits tax and then assuming on the other hand that the
profits tax is shifted forward through an increase in the price of products
sold domestically, with no increase in the price of products exported.2
But two hands prove to be inadequate for the analysis, because the
value-added tax, while generally assumed to be shifted forward in its
entirety, is occasionally assumed to leave the price level unaffected.
This requires two more hands for all the possible combinations, which
accounts, I presume, for the joint authorship. The assumptions are
passed from hand to hand with the skill and dexterity worthy of a
T-formation quarterback and my duties as a discussant might best be
served by spotting some of the more important plays and in the process
checking to see whether the ball has been dropped in the midst of the
hand-off.
REVIEW AND SUMMARY FINDINGS
In discussing world efficiency considerations with respect to a shift from
direct to indirect taxation, both goods and factor movements are exam-
ined. I have some doubts about the methodological approach of resting
the analysis upon two unrealistic assumptions—first, movement of fac-
tors without movement of goods and then the reverse—without proving
that the conclusions deduced thereby are additive. In particular, I am
concerned with the discussion in which factor movements alone are post-
ulated and the effects of export rebates and import taxes are deduced. I
do not understand how ER-IT can be examined where there are no
commodity flows, nor can I comprehend the meaning of distortions
between domestic and export industries in a situation where there are
1Fordefinition see Musgrave and Richman, Part 1, Sect. B, under Profits Tax
Versus Value-Added Tax, PT Not Shifted.
2Sincethis form of forward shifting is assumed throughout, I presume that the
authors' concept of reality is contained in it. This is interesting in itself, since the
type of firm pricing behavior depicted would be in violation of the U.S. antidumping
laws if practiced by foreign firms when exporting to the United States.
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no exports. The discussion of efficiency when commodity movements are
allowed, however, seems much more firmly based. If a value-added tax
is fully reflected in selling price and a profits tax is wholly absorbed
without price increases, then the allowance of an export rebate-import
tax arrangement only for the indirect tax will prevent distortions of
commodity flows and is thus in agreement with GATT rules. To the
extent, however, that an indirect tax is not passed on in higher prices
or a direct tax is forward shifted, then GATT rules inhibit the exports
and stimulate the imports of a country employing primarily profits taxes,
and some undesirable structural and aggregate capital effects will occur.
Turning to the question of the balance of payments, we see the im-
portance of the shifting assumption. If the profits tax is not shifted,
then its removal in favor of a value-added tax with ER-IT, which is
passed on in higher prices, yields the following results:
1. Prices of both import competing and export goods relative to other
countries are unchanged merchandise trade is not affected.
2. The profitability of export industries relative to domestic indus-
tries is unchanged, preventing any structural investment shift.
3. However, over-all profitability of investment will increase and
thereby encourage investment• of domestically owned capital at home
rather than abroad, and an inflow of capital from abroad will be en-
couraged. This will have favorable short-run consequences for the bal-
ance of payments, although the longer-run effects are a matter of
dispute.
If the profits tax is shifted forward, but only on domestic sales, then
its replacement by a value-added tax will affect the balance of payments
as follows:
1. Prices of imports will be raised relative to domestic goods and the
profit margin on exports will be raised relative to domestic sales, both
factors making for a surplus on the merchandise trade account of the
balance of payments.
2. The increase in the relative profitability of export industries will
lead to a structural shift in their favor and away from other domestic
industries with favorable long-run consequences on the balance of
payments.
3. International capital flows, however, would not be greatly affected.
Thus the balance of payments is likely to benefit in the short run
through the substitution of an indirect for a direct tax, irrespective of
the assumption about the incidence of the profits tax. If the profits
tax is not shifted forward, then the improvement will occur on the capital
135ALLOCATION, DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
account, but if the profits tax is shifted, the improvement will appear
in the current account. However, there is little indication of the degree
of improvement that can be expected under either alternative.
ER-IT FOR PROFITS TAX
The authors next analyze the consequences of adding an export rebate-
import compensation tax feature to a profits tax. Many of the same
benefits for the balance of payments can be achieved through this device
as with an indirect tax substitution. However, there are many difficulties
involved which may make the plan unworkable and possibly undesirable.
POLICY CONCLUSIONS
There is a marked shift in the tone of the paper when the authors present
their policy conclusions. The cautiousness of the taxonomic approach
is replaced by a direct expression of belief. Present taxing methods are
defended on efficiency grounds and the use of these changes in taxation
f or helping the balance of payments is deemed inappropriate. While the
weight of the arguments would appear to support the authors' judgment,
I suspect that some of the caution of the earlier sections should have
been maintained. The conclusion is reached that our trade share and
capital share are not depressed by current taxes without examining how
much shifting of the profits tax takes place in practice. The exclusion
of tax shifting from the policy discussion seems strange in view of the
central position of this variable in the previous analysis. If there is
short-run shifting of the profits tax, then our trade share may well
be depressed, particularly if the shifting includes export products. One
could have hoped that the authors' expert opinions on the shifting
question would have been presented. Furthermore, tax substitution for
the purpose of improving the balance of payments cannot be rejected
merely on the grounds that it constitutes tax dumping and is incon-
sistent with our ideal of international policy. In a world of fixed exchange
rates, encumbered with an inadequate international monetary mech-
anism yet subject to persistent imbalances, any policy selected to correct
the imbalance will be either inconsistent with liberal policies or will
force an intolerable burden on the domestic economies of deficit
countries.
The major value of having a tax system containing indirect taxes with
export rebates and import compensating taxes may well be the impre-
cision with which these rebates and compensating taxes are calcu].ated.
If a country is prepared to adjust these rates to the needs of the balance
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of payments, it obtains the equivalent of a flexible exchange rate con-
fined to the merchandise account. West Germany has in fact used these
taxes for that effect.3 While this type of adjustment mechanism is far
from perfect, it is certainly superior to many other alternatives open to
deficit countries. I am personally neither convinced of the need, nor
favorably disposed toward this approach to solving the U.S. balance-of-
payments problem, but I don't think it can be rejected out of hand.
While I have great admiration and respect for this excellent study,
much theoretical and empirical work remains to be done before those
charged with policy formation can weigh the merits of the tax policies
discussed in this paper. Since the substitution of a value-added tax for
the corporate profits tax would be a drastic measure, its reversal very
quickly would be unlikely if once enacted. This requires that the ques-
tion of long-run incidence and adjustment to the change be investigated.
Furthermore, some guidance must be provided as to the amount of
balance-of-payments improvement expected, not merely an expression
of the direction of change. This in turn requires a determination of the
degree of short-run forward shifting of the profits tax both on domestic
and foreign sales. One of the major contributions of this work by
Musgrave and Richman might well be the stimulation of further re-
search on these questions.
REPLY by Musgrave and Richman
Beginning with the international aspects,' we welcome the suggestionS
that the implications of the shifting assumption be brought out more
fully in the concluding section, particularly since one of the authors is
committed to the shifting hypothesis.2 As noted in the paper, the bal-
ance-of-payment effects of the substitution hinge on the shifting
assumption. Without short-run shifting of PT, the substitution is favor-
able on capital account, but without short-run price effects on trade.
With shifting, it is neutral on capital account, and short-run trade
effects are favorable. Substitution, therefore, is favorable in both cases.
Moreover, unilateral attachment by the United States of an ER-IT
arrangement to PT would be favorable, mostly on trade account, with
or without shifting assumption.
8Afterthe revaluation of the mark in 1961, West Germany decided that the
current account had deteriorated excessively and offset the exchange rate adjust-
ment in part through manipulation of taxes.
1Thesuggestion that product and factor mobility be dealt with jointly has been
allowed for by amending the text.
2SeeMarian and Richard A. Musgrave, TheShiftingof the Corpora-
tion Income Tax, Baltimore, 1963.
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This much for the mechanics of the matter. There remains the question
whether such steps should be taken. Proceeding on the assumption that
PT is shifted domestically, the GATT rule of excluding ER-IT for PT
is unjustified. The United States, therefore, would be entitled, without
offense against good international tax manners, to demand that such
an arrangement be applied. However, we should expect the same to be
done everywhere else, provided the same shifting assumption applies
abroad. In this case, our net gain would relate to the PT differential
only, and this differential, as noted in the paper, is rather slight. We
concur in the desire for hard empirical evidence in shifting patterns here
and abroad and suggest that the resources of the Brookings Institution
be applied thereto. In the meantime, the gain from applying ER-IT
to the corporation tax seems rather too slight to justify the complications
arising from such a policy.
It may be noted, moreover, that a logical extension of the shifting
assumption would require that the present crediting of foreign profits
taxes against the U.S. tax on foreign investment income be replaced
by permitting only the deduction of such taxes from taxable income.
While these complications might be avoided by outright substitution
of VT for PT, such a substitution would involve rather drastic changes
in the domestic tax structure, hardly acceptable without adequate taxa-
tion of capital gains; and if it is assumed that other countries follow suit,
the gain would again be limited to the modest differential of excess
These discouraging conclusions on the powers of tax policy are based
on the assumption that U.S. measures stay within the constraints of
liberal trade policy, i.e., that unilateral credits be limited to tax differ-
entials. But, as Krause points out, full preservation of liberal policies
may not be possible within a system of fixed exchange rates, and he is
entitled to ask why the tax tool should not assume its share of guilt
in saving the balance of payments. As always, the student of taxation
(trailing his star of the good tax structure) finds this an awkward
question.
While the use of taxation for control purposes is surely not to be
excluded in principle, the need for tax coordination in an increasingly
integrated world seems too great to be burdened, at this formative
stage of international tax policies, with the necessity of correcting for
maladjustments in the balance of payments. Specific tax measures which
improve the U.S. balance of payments, while at the same time promoting
or at least not severely damaging international tax neutrality, are all
to the good; but beyond this, we prefer the use of the more old-fashioned
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correctives, such as tariffs, export subsidies, or more direct impediments
to capital exports.
Turning now to the domestic aspects, we accept the objection that
substitution of for YT does not free earnings from old capital assets
of tax, since income therefrom is still taxed. Noting that this is similar
to the tax treatment of earnings from new capital, Shoup concludes
that no corrective is needed. If we assume that substitution of the value-
added tax leaves product prices unchanged, this seems correct. New
assets are acquired at the same cost as old assets. But suppose that
(owing to downward rigidity of wage rates) the substitution results in
rising prices. New investors now acquire their assets at higher prices
than holders of old assets did. Yet, the holders of old assets partake in
the increased income stream corresponding to the higher prices. If we
stipulate that depreciation (book and tax) is on a replacement cost basis,
Shoup's result of equal treatment still holds. But if depreciation is on
original cost basis, the net rate of return on old assets rises relative to
that on new assets, and capital gains result.
We thoroughly agree that, in fact, the corporation profits tax is not
always an "extra" tax but, for higher income shareholders, it acts as a
corrective for individual income tax avoidance. This should have been
made clear in the efficiency sections of the paper.
Finally, Shoup's brief comments on the appropriateness of to
compensate for cost-saving government expenditures leave us puzzled.
If we define public services which "reduce all costs equally" as services
which leave unchanged the relative costs of products whose cost mixes
(i.e., ratio of capital income originating to wage income originating)
differ, it follows that prepublic service costs are restored and the same
relative cost relationships are maintained by a tax which raises both
labor (wage) and capital (interest) cost at an equal rate. This, we sug-
gest, is done by which falls on all factor shares alike. This reasoning
assumes, as we believe is proper in this context, that the cost of capital is
increased to the user. If public services reduce labor cost only, the appro-
priate remedy, it seems to us, is a payroll tax; and if the reduction is
in capital cost only, an interest tax (in value-added terms an investment
tax, the reverse of the consumption tax) is in order.
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